Much attention has been focused recently on President Trump’s “new” foreign policy.
This policy change is symbolized by the U.S. missile attack on Syria'sShayrat airfield, which followed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s alleged chemical weapon attack on rebels in that country’s Idlib province.
The National Security Council has also been restructured. Former Director Michael Flynn resigned after lying about his meetings with the Russian ambassador to the U.S. Deputy K.T. McFarland was cashiered and becameU.S. ambassador-designate to Singapore. They have been replaced by retired General H. R. McMaster as director, and his deputy for strategy, Dina Powell. The removal of Trump adviser Steve Bannon from the principals committee of the council also represents an apparent move to follow more traditional foreign policy-making.
What is driving this apparently positive change? The movement toward an apparently more traditional approach suggests the greater influence of Trump’s daughter Ivanka, who was recently named a regular employee of the White House, and her husband Jared Kushner, a senior adviser to the president over Bannon. Both may be trying to repair what “The Gatekeepers” author Chris Whipple has called “the most dysfunctional White House chief of staff and presidency in U.S. history.”
The two family members have strengthened a White House faction Bannon describes, not admiringly, as the “New Yorkers” or simply “Goldman Sachs.” Bannon himself leads an opposing faction that is more nationalist, isolationist and populist.
However this rivalry plays out, what has been clear during the “honeymoon phase” of the Trump presidency is that influential individuals have created an incoherent, impulsive style of governance, dominated by personal decision-making processes, such as the overnight decision to bomb Syria. This spasmodic style, ignoring interagency reviews, is new in the modern presidency, even among presidents like Kennedy and Clinton, who involved family members in their administrations. Trump relies on personal relationships, rather than the institutions of democracy.
As a comparative political scientist who studies different types of governments, I’m interested in how personal rule linked to family can erode democratic institutions in favor of authoritarianism. Academics call this “sultanism.”
Let me explain.
What sultanism means
It was over a century ago that the famous political sociologist Max Weber developed the concept of sultanism, which, he wrote, “operates primarily on the basis of discretion.”
“Sultans,” or kings, of the Ottoman Empire were absolute rulers, their power made legitimate by theology. They used arbitrary and despotic powers. Their lifestyles were lavish and decadent. And over time they lost their power. While rival European empires such as the Hapsburgs’ Austro-Hungary and Weber’s native Germany were rising in the 19th century as they developed impressive civil and military bureaucracies and procedures, the Ottoman Empire was declining.
Alfred Stepan and the late Juan J. Linz of Columbia University argued that sultanism is both a regime type (like democracy and authoritarianism) and an adjective describing a style of personal rule that is possible under all regime types, including democracy. They wrote:

