Public-sector banks need autonomy and professional governance to compete
The absence of "phone banking" today offers no institutional guarantee against its return. Stronger PSB balance sheets offer an opportunity to reform from a position of strength
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6 min read Last Updated : Nov 16 2026 | 11:22 PM IST
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The government has constituted a High-Level Committee on Banking for Viksit Bharat. It will review the sector’s legal and regulatory framework, prudential norms and capital needs, and chart a path to globally competitive Indian banks. Its terms of reference do not explicitly mention public-sector bank (PSB) governance. Yet, it cannot sidestep how a substantial part of Indian banking is owned and run.
Past committees and their recommendations
The Narasimham committees of 1991 and 1998 recommended greater operational autonomy for PSBs, professional boards and management, freedom from political and administrative interference, and a more competitive banking ecosystem. They sought to end dual control by the finance ministry and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), giving primacy to the latter. Narasimham II also proposed that government ownership be reduced to 33 per cent.
The P J Nayak committee of 2014 proposed transferring government shareholdings to a professionally managed Bank Investment Company, bringing PSBs under the Companies Act instead of their special governing statutes, and empowering bank boards to appoint management, determine remuneration, and oversee performance. It also sought ownership-neutral RBI regulation.
These recommendations emerged in difficult circumstances. Narasimham I followed the 1991 economic crisis. Narasimham II came amid persistent weaknesses in asset quality. In 2014, another wave of stressed PSB loans had built up, though yet to be recognised.
PSBs — healthier and socially relevant
Today, PSBs are considerably healthier. Average price-to-book ratios of large PSBs have risen from around 0.6 in the late 2010s to 1 in recent years. Their return on equity, negative for much of the previous decade, has recovered to 15 per cent.
But this follows an expensive clean-up. Between FY10 and FY25, PSBs, including IDBI Bank, wrote off around ₹13.6 trillion of loans. Writeoffs do not necessarily represent final losses, since recoveries can follow. Between FY13 and FY22, the government infused ₹3.75 trillion into PSBs, including IDBI.
This does not mean that government ownership is undesirable. An August 2022 study by RBI economists in their personal capacity found that while private banks were more profit-efficient, PSBs performed better on financial inclusion, and their lending was less procyclical.
PSBs remain central to financial inclusion. Their share of overall scheduled commercial bank deposits has fallen from around 75 per cent in 2011 to below 60 per cent. Yet they still hold over 80 per cent of rural deposits and around 70 per cent in semi-urban areas. They remain important providers of micro, small and medium enterprises credit.
The government’s developmental objectives are important. However, where the government seeks outcomes beyond obligations applicable to all banks, explicit guarantees, interest subsidies or viability-gap support could be offered to both public and private lenders alike. Any costs should appear in the Budget, rather than being absorbed through PSB cross-subsidies or lower returns.
Public ownership and professional management
In addition, public ownership does not confer banking expertise or justify combining the roles of shareholder, manager, and supervisor.
According to its annual report, the finance ministry’s Department of Financial Services (DFS) handles PSB chief executive and whole-time director appointments, their remuneration and service conditions, analysis of operating results, scrutiny of and follow-up action on RBI’s inspections of PSBs, monitoring of bad loans and recoveries, and responsibilities concerning auditors. While some shareholder oversight is legitimate, many of these functions would ordinarily rest primarily with bank boards, management or the banking regulator.
This creates an uneven playing field. PSB boards have a limited role in senior appointments and pay. In FY26, the remuneration of chief executives at the three largest private banks was 15-30 times that of their counterparts at large PSBs, even before accounting for some equity-linked incentives. PSB chiefs also typically have shorter tenures, limiting continuity in leadership and strategy, a concern also flagged by the Nayak committee.
Regulatory powers are asymmetric. The RBI lacks certain statutory powers available over private banks, including those relating to PSB management removal and board supersession. In March 2018, then RBI Governor Urjit Patel argued that banking regulatory powers should be ownership-neutral.
DFS is staffed by capable civil servants, but senior officials rotate across government assignments. Overseeing complex banks demands sustained expertise in credit, risk, capital and strategy. A professionally managed institution and board with dedicated banking expertise may be better placed to discharge these responsibilities, with less political and administrative influence.
International experience
International experience offers lessons, but no ready template. Singapore’s Temasek owns 28 per cent of DBS, leaving commercial decisions to its professional board and management, while the Monetary Authority of Singapore regulates the bank. Britain placed its peak 84 per cent RBS (NatWest) stake under an arm’s-length ownership agency and reduced its holdings over time. OECD guidelines advocate professional ownership, merit-based boards, and separation of ownership from regulation.
There are cautionary examples too. German savings banks have substantial political involvement in governance, and research documents political influences on lending. Several Landesbanken (regional state-owned banks) separately required rescues after 2008. Brazilian public banks have experienced repeated government support. China's Central Huijin demonstrates that a holding company can come with extensive political control.
India needs a model suited to its circumstances. But how the state owns banks matters as much as whether it owns them. A professional government ownership entity must have credible independence, with bank boards controlling strategy, executive appointments and remuneration. RBI regulation should be ownership-neutral. Creating another bureaucratic layer without transferring real authority would accomplish little.
Awaiting the 1991 moment
The absence of “phone banking” today offers no institutional guarantee against its return. Stronger PSB balance sheets offer an opportunity to reform from a position of strength.
The 1991 reforms dismantled the Licence Raj and marked a break from the idea that government should occupy the commanding heights of the economy, direct businesses, and allocate capital. Banking needs its 1991 moment, separating government ownership from operational control. That requires political leaders and administrators willing to relinquish authority.
Ultimately, PSBs should compete on a level playing field, with minimum government and maximum governance, accountable to their boards and all shareholders, and subject to RBI supervision.
The writer is senior India analyst, Observatory Group
Disclaimer: These are personal views of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of www.business-standard.com or the Business Standard newspaper
