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Crosscurrents in 'Keralam': Are vote shares signalling flux in politics?

Civic poll results have complicated the state's binary politics and narrowed the Left's margin for error. Are vote shares signalling flux?

Kerala, Politics, voting
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Sneha Sasikumar

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One and a half months before the Kerala Assembly election, the state stands at a pivotal juncture. Can the Communist Party of India (Marxist)-led Left Democratic Front (LDF) secure an unprecedented third consecutive term? What does anti-incumbency mean on the ground? Is Kerala — set to be rechristened Keralam — edging toward a tripolar contest? With Prime Minister Narendra Modi set to spearhead the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP’s) campaign push in March, can the party build on its Thiruvananthapuram breakthrough? And what would all these mean for the future of the Left in India?
 
The 2025 local body elections have altered Kerala’s political landscape. The Congress-led United Democratic Front (UDF) posted a commanding lead across all tiers of local governance, cutting into the ruling LDF’s base. 
 
The UDF secured 38.81 per cent of the vote to the LDF’s 33.45 per cent, according to the State Election Commission — a gap of 5.36 percentage points.
 
The margin mirage
 
History tempers the headline numbers. In 2010, a 3.73-percentage point civic poll lead shrank to just 0.89 percentage points in the subsequent Assembly election, an erosion of nearly four-fifths. If a similar compression occurs in 2026, today’s UDF advantage could narrow sharply.
 
Precedent favours volatility. In 2015, the LDF’s 0.13-percentage point civic poll edge widened to 4.68 points in the 2016 Assembly election, a near 35-fold expansion. Five years later, a 2.30-percentage point local body election lead in 2020 stretched to 5.90 percentage points in the 2021 Assembly polls. Twice in succession, the Left outperformed its civic baseline when stakes rose. 
 
On the 2025 results, CPI(M) MP John Brittas rejected what he termed a triumphalist narrative. “Yes, the Left received a setback in local body elections in Kerala. But what is the reality behind the so-called watershed adjective used by the PM?” he said, accusing both Congress and BJP of deliberately shaping the narrative.
 
The BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) recorded a landmark breakthrough, capturing the Thiruvananthapuram corporation and ending the CPI(M)’s hold over the city dating back to 1980. Arya Rajendran, who became India’s youngest mayor at 21, lost her seat. In Thrissur, however, the BJP fell short. Actor-turned-politician Suresh Gopi’s 2024 Lok Sabha win had raised expectations of a civic poll gain, but the UDF retained the city.
 
Congress leader Rahul Gandhi had hailed the results on X as a sign of “growing confidence in the UDF” and a pointer to an Assembly sweep. Senior Kerala Congress leader Ramesh Chennithala called it “the people’s victory,” asserting that the UDF had captured the LDF’s power centres. 
 
Why does this election matter?
 
Local body poll outcomes in Kerala often foreshadow Assembly momentum. Since the early 1980s, the state has largely alternated between UDF and LDF governments.
 
When civic polls were first conducted under the three-tier panchayat system in 1995, the LDF swept rural and urban bodies, presaging its 1996 Assembly win. The 2000 local polls were closely fought, and the LDF ceded power to the UDF in 2001. By 2005, the Left had rebounded, winning a majority of local bodies and going on to claim 98 of 140 Assembly seats in 2006.
 
The pattern held, until 2021, when the Left defied Kerala’s tradition of alternating governments, securing a historic second consecutive term under Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan.
 
The Left’s fault lines
 
The 2025 results exposed vulnerabilities, particularly in northern Kerala’s districts where Muslim population is significant — Malappuram and parts of Kannur and Kozhikode — where the Left ceded ground. Voters long aligned with the party’s secular positioning appear to be reassessing.’
 
Vijayan’s pointed references to “league alliances” were widely interpreted as aimed at Muslim voters backing the UDF. The government’s initial acceptance of the Centre’s PM-SHRI school scheme, opposed by Muslim organisations, suggested ideological recalibration. Outreach efforts such as the Global Ayyappa Sangamam initiative further sharpened perceptions of repositioning. The Sabarimala temple gold theft case, allegedly involving a CPI(M) leader, added to unease. The central question is whether 2025 reflects broad anti-incumbency, or a more targeted anti-Pinarayi sentiment.
 
Compared with previous civic poll cycles, the losses are significant but not structural. What is different this time is the BJP’s presence. In 2010, it was peripheral. In 2025, it is a factor. Should the LDF lose in 2026, it would mark the first time since 1977 that Communist parties hold no state government in India.