How Shapoorji Pallonji's debt mounted and why repayment is a challenge
Shapoorji Pallonji is seeking fresh funds to meet its debt obligations, as high borrowing costs, repeated refinancing and difficulties in selling its Tata Sons stake complicate efforts to reduce debt
)
The Shapoorji Pallonji Group is seeking fresh funds to meet debt obligations.
Listen to This Article
The Shapoorji Pallonji (SP) Group is seeking to raise $150 million-$200 million amid mounting debt obligations, Bloomberg reported. About half the proceeds will go towards repaying creditors of Porteast Investment Ltd, another group entity, while the remainder will be used to service other group debt.
This follows a fundraising exercise completed in July, when the group accepted bids worth ₹21,500 crore ($2.25 billion) for a three-year rupee bond issue, primarily to refinance existing borrowings rather than fund expansion. Eqyizen Investment, an SP Group company, raised funds through three-year zero-coupon rupee bonds yielding 18.95 per cent.
The SP Group owns around 18.4 per cent of Tata Sons but has struggled to monetise the holding. This raises the question: why does a group with such a valuable asset continue to face expensive refinancing?
How did the SP Group's debt accumulate?
The group's financial stress predates the Covid-19 pandemic, with aggressive expansion and long cash-conversion cycles contributing to its mounting debt. Known for its low-risk, asset-light engineering and construction (E&C) business, the SP Group expanded into capital-intensive infrastructure projects and large-scale real estate developments.
These projects required substantial upfront spending on land acquisition, regulatory approvals and development, while taking several years to generate meaningful cash flows. This tied up capital and constrained liquidity.
Also Read
The pressure was evident in the flagship Shapoorji Pallonji and Company Private Limited (SPCPL), whose consolidated debt, including mobilisation advances, rose to ₹33,407 crore in FY19 from ₹25,692 crore in FY18. In November 2019, rating agency Icra downgraded SPCPL's credit ratings, citing worsening liquidity cushions across the group and mounting financial pressure from slow asset monetisation.
How did the Covid pandemic deepen the crisis?
The Covid-19 pandemic compounded existing financial stress just as major repayment deadlines approached. Lockdowns and labour shortages disrupted construction and real estate operations, drying up collections while fixed costs persisted. In FY21, the flagship company faced standalone repayment obligations of ₹5,320 crore, while the wider group had ₹10,000 crore due on a consolidated basis.
Unable to generate sufficient cash internally, SPCPL sought a one-time restructuring under the Reserve Bank of India's (RBI's) Covid-19 resolution framework, according to Business Standard report. Lenders approved the plan in March 2021, extending repayment timelines and providing breathing room. The group committed to selling non-core businesses and stakes, including Eureka Forbes and Sterling & Wilson Solar, to raise cash and reduce debt.
How did SP try to reduce its borrowings?
The flagship company exited the RBI restructuring programme in 2022, ahead of schedule, after repaying ₹12,450 crore to lenders. By the end of FY22, it had reduced total external debt by approximately ₹13,500 crore.
The debt reduction relied heavily on asset sales and promoter support rather than operational cash flows alone. The group exited its consumer services holding, Eureka Forbes, and sold a controlling stake in Sterling and Wilson Renewable Energy. The Mistry family also infused cash to support repayments.
However, the reduction in the flagship company's debt did not eliminate the wider group's financial stress. Substantial borrowings helped fund operations and repay the flagship company's debt, leaving the group with recurring refinancing requirements.
Why is the Tata Sons stake difficult to monetise?
The Mistry family's 18.4 per cent stake in Tata Sons is both the group's financial asset and a major constraint. Tata Sons is privately held, and its shares cannot be readily traded on a public stock exchange. The group has repeatedly used the stake as collateral to raise funds and meet maturing obligations. While this provides immediate cash, it replaces existing debt with new borrowing rather than reducing the overall debt burden.
The issue became more pressing during the July 2026 fundraising round, when institutional investors were assured that a way to unlock money from the Tata Sons stake would be found within 18 months, reported Reuters. This means the group faces pressure to list, sell or restructure the stake by early 2028 to meet lenders’ expectations and avoid problems with the shares pledged as security for loans.
How did repeated refinancing become a problem?
The group has repeatedly replaced maturing loans with new borrowings to avoid immediate defaults. However, as its financial position became more complex, investors demanded higher returns, increasing borrowing costs.
In 2021, promoter entity Sterling Investments raised approximately $2.6 billion. In 2023, another promoter vehicle, Goswami Infratech, raised around ₹14,300 crore through zero-coupon bonds carrying an effective yield of 18.75 per cent. Further refinancing was required in 2025 to meet maturing liabilities, followed by another major fundraising exercise in July 2026, when the rupee financing component carried a yield of 18.95 per cent.
Zero-coupon bonds do not require regular interest payments. Instead, interest accumulates over the loan's tenure, increasing the final amount payable at maturity. High yields therefore inflate repayment obligations and can force the group to refinance increasingly large sums, perpetuating the debt cycle.
Where does the group stand now?
According to a Moneycontrol report, in September 2026, the group repaid approximately ₹3,500 crore to bondholders using additional financing from existing institutional lenders, addressing immediate repayment obligations.
There have also been improvements in the flagship company's operations. According to Icra's May 2026 assessment, its core construction margin rose to 5.4 per cent in FY26 on a provisional basis, from 2.4 per cent in FY25. However, Icra continued to flag weak operating cash flows and stretched liquidity across the wider organisation. Ultimately, the group's ability to escape its debt cycle will depend on stronger operating cash flows, sustained deleveraging and successful monetisation of assets, including its valuable Tata Sons holding.
More From This Section
Don't miss the most important news and views of the day. Get them on our Telegram channel
First Published: Oct 29 2026 | 11:35 AM IST
