Choose to negotiate

Dialogue with China more useful than raising the temperature

Recent skirmishes on the India-China border in the Sikkim region, leading to the cancellation of the Mansarovar Yatra pilgrimage through the Nathu La route, have underlined the need for a rethink on India’s current approach to dealing with its north-eastern neighbour. The foreign policy and defence establishments, therefore, need to guard against the possibility of the country becoming a pawn in the larger contest between two superpowers, China and the United States. Muscular responses from the army chief about India’s readiness to “fight a two-and-a-half front war” may play well to the domestic audience, but it ignores the urgent need for India to balance its interests with its capabilities. Few diplomats would have been unaware of the timing of the Chinese challenge. It occurred just as Prime Minister Narendra Modi concluded a $3-billion deal to buy US-made drones and a plan for trilateral naval exercises, including Japan, in the Bay of Bengal later this month. Some sort of Chinese riposte was thus inevitable.

China’s reiterated refusal to support India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group ahead of the Modi-Trump meeting and its continuing effort to block a United Nations resolution to label Lashkar-e-Taiba chief Hafiz Saeed a terrorist, even as the US ups the ante on cross-border terrorism, are clear signals of mounting concerns of India’s US “tilt”. New Delhi rightly regards a closer American embrace as serving Indian interests — a possible easing of rules for H1B visas and providing better access for pharmaceutical exports in return for easier market access for US firms. This friendship may also bolster the feel-good factor. Common sense, however, dictates that this relationship, however desirable, needs to be balanced by an understanding of the rising challenger over the Himalaya, with whom India shares a 3,500-km long border, disputes over which involve endless arguments over opaque and contested historical facts. 

Equally significant, the world’s second-largest economy is five times larger than India and has military capabilities that are manifestly superior. In the past, both countries pragmatically separated border issues in the interests of deepening the strategic direction. Despite a conspicuous personal outreach by Mr Modi at the start of his term, relations can scarcely be considered to be on an even keel. India’s decision not to participate in the One Belt One Road initiative may be rooted in sensible economics — principally that it demands the use of Chinese credit and equipment — but to stay away from the initiative altogether was surely unwise, as is the decision to put China at a disadvantage in India’s domestic market. 

The tough talk on Sikkim may partly reflect a realisation of India’s narrowing options in the face of China’s economic and military superiority and its expanding presence in the oceans, islands and mountains around India. Put baldly, India has nothing to gain from even a limited confrontation with China and it urgently needs to lower the temperature on Nathu La. A distant friend may help, even though it involves an unpredictable leader. But nothing will be lost if India were to engage with China in a dialogue.