Let’s review the facts first. Inflation did not jump overnight. It has been steadily rising since January and crossed the RBI’s 4 per cent target in June. Core inflation, which leaves out food and fuel, has also been going up. It has increased from 3.3 per cent in January to 4.6 per cent in October. According to the latest data, inflation rose in 11 of the 12 groups of the consumer price index. The pressure is no longer limited to a few items.
Three factors are responsible for this.
First, food inflation has more than doubled from 4 per cent in April to 8.5 per cent in October. El Nino conditions meant that India received only 87 per cent of its long-term average rainfall during the June-September monsoon season, the lowest since 2015. Deficient rainfall has affected the kharif (summer) crop and also the reservoir levels, raising concerns about the ongoing rabi (winter) crop output too.
Second, the war in West Asia has pushed up prices of crude oil and gas. The Indian government raised petrol and diesel prices by about 8 per cent. Prices of commercial LPG and other inputs such as chemicals and plastics went up by more. Wholesale inflation averaged 10.4 per cent in the July-September quarter. Over time, firms pass on higher input costs to consumers. Higher energy prices also pushed up transport inflation from nearly 0 per cent in April to 5.8 per cent in October.
Third, there is a demand dimension. If official data is to be believed, real gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 7.8 per cent in April-June. Non-food bank credit grew at a staggering rate of 19 per cent in September. Personal loans from banks grew 17.3 per cent, against 11.5 per cent a year ago while retail loans from non-banking finance companies (NBFCs) grew 21.9 per cent. Households are borrowing to spend. This suggests that we have an economy that is growing at close to 8 per cent, where credit-fuelled consumption is pushing up demand, and that has faced two supply shocks in one year — an energy shock and a food shock.
Now let’s look at the RBI’s monetary policy conduct against this background.
These risks were visible well before October. The RBI itself flagged the oil shock and the El Niño risk in its April policy. But it kept the repo rate unchanged at 5.25 per cent in its April, June and August meetings. It raised the rate to 5.5 per cent in October. That hike only reversed the cut of December 2025.
In fact, in its August meeting, the RBI lowered its inflation forecast for the year to 5 per cent, even though inflation was rising every month. The August meeting was interesting for another reason. The minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting revealed that some members were concerned about persistent inflationary pressures, strong credit growth and rising inflation expectations of households. But, the monetary policy statement published by the RBI came across as more dovish. This suggests that the RBI did not give sufficient weight to the possibility that persistent food and energy shocks would spread to other prices.
The result is that with a repo rate of 5.5 per cent and a headline CPI inflation of 6.09 per cent, the real rate is roughly -0.6 per cent. This means that monetary policy needs to be sufficiently more contractionary in order to bring inflation down to the target level of 4 per cent.
The RBI’s reasoning may be that supply shocks are temporary and a central bank should look through them. This holds when it is a one-time shock, demand is weak and expectations are stable. It is harder to defend when two supply shocks come together, growth is strong, credit is growing at 19 per cent and core inflation is rising. In such conditions, supply shocks spread to wages and other prices. While monetary policy cannot produce more rainfall or lower global oil prices, it can play a crucial role in preventing a supply shock from becoming a persistent inflation problem.
Why does this matter? It matters because inflation is a tax on households. It hurts the poor and the middle class the most. The inflation targeting framework was adopted in 2016 to avoid such episodes. Also, there is a cost to waiting. Once households start revising their inflation expectations upwards, bringing inflation down becomes harder. The RBI may now have to raise rates by more, and keep them higher for longer, to lower both inflation and inflation expectations but at a greater cost to growth.
Hopefully, the central bank would take decisive action going forward to halt the steady rise in inflation and bring it back to the 4 per cent target.
The writer is associate professor of economics, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai