India's carbon credit market needs liquidity and credible price signals
The need is to have liquidity and depth in the market
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Illustration: Ajaya Kumar Mohanty
6 min read Last Updated : Nov 15 2026 | 10:34 PM IST
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It is good news that the United Kingdom has recognised India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) as a pricing mechanism under its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which takes effect in January next year. The benefit to Indian exporters, however, rests entirely on the carbon price the CCTS produces.
The CCTS, as it exists today, needs much improvement. This column focuses on how to have liquidity and depth in the carbon-trading market so that the scheme throws up the right and credible carbon price.
To begin with, the scheme should ensure that there is sufficient demand for carbon-credit certificates (CCCs) in the market at any given time. All the proposed units in different sectors, as announced under the scheme, should be notified in one go. Apart from building demand, this will improve liquidity in the market. The exclusion of high-emitting sectors such as thermal power, which accounts for roughly 40 per cent of national emission, makes no sense. Further, at present, the scheme sets different targets for greenhouse-gas emission for different units in a sector, based on their past emission levels; the laggards in the past have been given softer targets. This is sure to kill demand, besides being unfair to better-performing units. All this would result in an illiquid market and a weak price, not reflective of the true price. The similar category of units within a sector, based on a criterion like revenue or asset size, should be given the same targets. For instance, the integrated steel plants of similar production capacity should be given the same targets.More importantly, the targets ought to be ambitious from the very beginning, in line with our emission reduction commitments, and the MRV (measurement, reporting and verification) framework robust. Going forward, more sectors should be notified under the scheme at the earliest.
Under the scheme, entities performing better than the targets would be entitled to get CCCs, which would be credited in their accounts, free of cost, by the Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE). Underperforming entities can then purchase the required CCCs in the market from those having them. On the trading of CCCs, one could perhaps take a leaf out of the highly successful process followed in the stock market, though admittedly CCCs and stocks are different.
Like stock exchanges (SEs), the exchanges on which CCCs would trade (herein after referred to as exchanges) may keep a small window before the start of trading day for call auction to determine the opening price of a CCC. In case there is no participation by entities in the call auction, the previous-day closing price will be the opening price. The closing price will be the volume-adjusted weighted average price (VWAP) derived during the last half an hour of trading in the day. Depending on the level of volatility in trading prices at any given time, the exchanges may prescribe a price band, with the floor and ceiling being a certain percentage of the price. The clearing and settlement mechanism may be through a clearing corporation.
There are two suggestions for improving liquidity in the carbon-trading market. The exchanges may introduce a market-making scheme in the first few years of trading. Market makers are financial institutions that simultaneously give “buy” and “sell” quotes to improve liquidity. Of course, they would need to be compensated for the losses incurred by them. SEs have schemes on market making for illiquid stocks, eg stocks for small and medium enterprises. The exchanges could learn from the experience of SEs.
The other suggestion to improve the depth of the market is to introduce derivatives trading for CCCs. The obligated entities could lock in compliance costs by buying futures. Futures prices would give an early signal of where the carbon price is heading. The European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) shows the scale this can reach. Nearly 90 per cent of allowances trade as futures, and about 65 per cent of secondary-market participants are financial players who typically sell the futures that compliance firms buy to protect themselves against rising prices. South Korea offers what happens in the absence of financial players. With financial participants initially excluded, allowance trading stalled for eight months in 2015, and only 0.06 per cent of allocated allowances changed hands in the first year. After state banks were appointed market makers in 2019 and financial intermediaries were admitted, annual traded volumes rose from 5.66 million tonnes in 2015 to 54.72 million tonnes by 2021.
While the market for CCCs may be regulated by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC), the futures market may come under the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Sebi) like it does for the derivatives market for commodities. A similar arrangement exists for electricity trading. Electricity futures, launched in July 2025, rest on a clear division of roles. The CERC oversees physical power trading on the exchanges, while Sebi regulates futures settled in cash against those exchange prices. A clearing corporation guarantees every contract and collects margins upfront, and protect against defaults. Within their first year, futures volumes on the National Stock Exchange alone reached roughly half the physical day-ahead market, evidence that hedging demand exists once the infrastructure is in place.
The futures on CCCs should trade on Sebi-regulated exchanges, and settled against the VWAP prices discovered in the physical market. The overall and participant-specific position limits, as a percentage of the trading volumes in the physical market, would need to be put to ensure that the futures market doesn’t manipulate the physical market.
The CCTS begins on a rather tentative note. The scheme was notified in 2023 but trading is yet to start. It is not a good idea to begin the scheme on a weak footing. Any failure would be seen as a non-serious attempt by the government. Except for the suggestions relating to the derivatives market, all other suggestions made above, including allowing financial institutions participation as market makers, may be made part of the scheme right away. The derivatives market may be introduced later at an appropriate time, but the intention to develop it in future should find mention in the scheme now itself so as to give the right message to the world at large about our commitment to develop a credible carbon market in the country.
The writers are, respectively, former chairman, Sebi, and research assistant, Observer Research Foundation
Disclaimer: These are personal views of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of www.business-standard.com or the Business Standard newspaper
Topics : Climate Change India UK trade BS Opinion
