Eighty years ago, an international organisation, the United Nations, was set up and its agreed charter defined the legality of relations between States and established diplomatic practices that favoured restraint and mutual respect. This global standard of behaviour by countries was also reflected in the charters of several other international institutions. To a certain extent, this held true even during the first four and a half decades of its existence that were dominated by tension between the United States and the USSR. Over the past three decades, polycentrism has emerged with substantial rise in the global impact of China, particularly in trade. The incidence of inter-State wars has also declined to some extent.
In recent years, this world of balanced relations between nations and restraint in official wars has been diluted — and lately, even disappeared. Substantial interstate wars have surfaced in the Russia-Ukraine war, in the genocidal war waged by Israel in Gaza, and the attacks on Iran. Another older example is the attack on Iraq in 2003, led by the US, and supported by the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland, which, unlike the 1991 attack, was not authorised by the UN. Of course, over the past decades, wars without UN authorisation have taken place and justified on the grounds of self-defence, which is permissible under the UN Convention.
A major area of success that was important for speeding up development in the post-World War II era was the trade agreement among nations. This global agreement on trade is being vigorously demolished by the US under Donald Trump. But what is worse is the departure from restraint and respect for national independence, which is so evident in Mr Trump’s statements about America’s capacity to kill the head of State in Iran, and his aggressive remarks to the head of State in Brazil about their treatment of the former Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro. In fact, Mr Trump seems quite keen on making hostile comments about other heads of State.
These departures from established rules are being largely ignored by most states in their response to Mr Trump’s actions. Many are even tolerating the gross breaches of diplomatic courtesy that have become commonplace, particularly in Mr Trump’s statements. If a tough neighbour abuses you with demands and you respond to the demands while tolerating the abuse, your behaviour amounts, in effect, to complicity. That is precisely what we are doing in coping with Mr Trump’s aggression.
What can be done to counter a strong and aggressive country that, in effect, bullies other countries individually? Consider the example of a bully in a school. In my school, there was one who, during the break, would stand in a spot and summon any lone student walking past to give him a couple of whacks on the head. But if a group of connected students walked past together, the bully did not dare to summon even one of them. In the same way, what we need today are groups of states that can act collectively to counter or neutralise adverse US actions.
At the inter-country relationship level, we cannot count on actions sanctioned by the UN or other international organisations like the World Trade Organization or the International Monetary Fund. The answer lies in what are labelled as “Coalitions of the Willing”. These are initiatives of a group of countries that support an international initiative that does not get formal UN support, generally because of the opposition of one or more powerful countries.
There are two specific examples from the ’90s — the treaty banning anti-personnel landmines and the agreement to set up the International Criminal Court. These coalitions were promoted by Canada and Italy, respectively, and included other countries that agreed with the aim, leading to outcomes that had a significant positive impact on global cooperation. However, India was not part of these coalitions. A similar move that did not get or require formal UN agreement was the 2000 Jubilee Debt Initiative on debt forgiveness, launched by an NGO and pushed by the UK. Incidentally, there is now a new 2025 Jubilee Debt Initiative.
An effective Coalition of the Willing that can make a significant difference in international politics or the global economy cannot be formed on a general-purpose basis to counter the aggressive bullying by the US. It is unlikely to come up as a response to trade policy disruptions, and certainly, quite impossible for some such coalition to reduce the risks of war. It must be focussed on more specific cooperative actions to respond to some recent adverse switches in US policy.
My first suggestion relates to two agricultural research institutions which have had a positive global impact and are now being denied substantial funds they received from the US. One is the Mexico-based International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre, and the other is the Philippines-based International Rice Research Institute. The removal of US financial support is a major problem and could endanger the quality of their very useful global impact. They have been a major source of support for agriculture in India and many other countries. A Coalition of the Willing to counter the adverse decision of the US could be set up by India and other beneficiary countries, which could take on the responsibility of compensating for the loss of funding from the US — a loss that may not be offset by other major donors who are also reducing their aid provisions.
The second, perhaps more difficult, suggestion is action by a coalition of countries to compensate for the recent backtracking by the US on its carbon reduction promises. The US under President Trump withdrew from the Paris Agreement, and his “big, beautiful budget” has reversed actions undertaken by the previous administration to promote carbon emission reduction. This will reduce the emission cuts promised by the US for 2030 from 40 per cent to just 3 per cent, resulting in an increase of about 2 billion tonnes of CO₂ in 2030 relative to what was promised.
Formal action on correcting this at the international level is not possible. Hence, some major countries committed to action on climate change can form a Coalition of the Willing that takes on some commitment to compensate for the US’ planned failure to deliver what it had promised for 2030. Covering the full gap of 2 billion tonnes of CO₂ will not be affordable, but even partial compensation by a group of countries would keep alive the idea of inter-country cooperation for global ends. India has the capacity to raise its goal of carbon reduction by 2030 and can join other countries that also have such potential in a Coalition for Global Cooperation on Climate Change Risks.
The emergence of a few Coalitions of the Willing to pursue some of the agreed global ends will be a partial answer that keeps alive the prospects envisaged 80 years ago. It cannot eliminate the bullying power of a powerful State, but it can dilute the impact of some of its anti-global acts. Hopefully, it may also influence public opinion in the US on how its federal government should behave.
The author was under secretary-general for economic and social affairs at the United Nations.
desaind@icloud.com