The circular raises several concerns. For one, the definition of a BO in the Prevention of Money Laundering Act is “a natural person or persons who, whether acting alone or acting together, have controlling ownership interest in the FPI or control over the FPI.” If a BO cannot be identified in this manner, a senior managing official of the FPI is construed to be its BO. Moreover, the word “control” is also defined vaguely in the Prevention of Money Laundering Act; it includes the right to appoint a majority of directors, or control management or policy decisions, by virtue of shareholding, management rights, shareholders' agreements and/or voting agreements. Taking these definitions together and given the organisational structure of most FPIs, many of them would end up with a single officer defined as the BO for Sebi's purposes.
But in a Japanese FPI, for instance, one person may be handling thousands of accounts. The ownership limits would then be clubbed and applied to that single individual. In that case, if two entities hold positions that, taken together, exceed the 10 per cent limit, the FPI may be forced to divest. This will have a direct bearing on the functioning of global asset management companies such as Fidelity, BlackRock, Franklin Templeton and Goldman that run multiple funds in India. In addition to this issue, which could trigger selling, there are also concerns about privacy. The KYC form demands disclosure of intimate information such as address, date of birth, tax residency number, social security number and passport number, among others. Global privacy norms make FPIs uncomfortable with regard to sharing this level of information.
It would be advisable for Sebi to review this order. It is unusual for any regime anywhere to demand this level of differentiated information for KYC. There will also be practical difficulties in imposing the limit unless the definition of a BO is redefined pragmatically, or the limit removed. The intent of the circular — avoiding money laundering or round-tripping of hawala funds — is clear enough, but there must be less disruptive ways to do that without forcing legitimate investors to exit.