India's Maldives moment

An opportunity to repair ties must be handled with discretion

No one was surprised when India was among the first countries to welcome the decisive victory of the joint opposition candidate, Ibu Solih, over incumbent president Abdulla Yameen, the China-supported strongman. With over 85 per cent of the island-nation's electorate of 262,135 turning out to vote in the first presidential election since 2013, the result represents a conclusive rejection of Mr Yameen’s authoritarian rule. The question is whether this marks the diminution of Chinese influence in this Indian Ocean archipelago. Maldivian politics has been tumultuous and murky since 2012, when the first democratically elected president, Mohamed Nasheed, was forced from office in circumstances that were unclear. Since then, Mr Yameen, who came to power in disputed elections in 2013, has ruled with an iron hand, withdrawing from the Commonwealth, conspicuously courting China and weakening traditional ties with India — cancelling Indian company GMR’s contract to modernise Male airport, rejecting visa renewals of Indians working in the Maldives, and declining to participate in joint naval exercises earlier this year. In February, Mr Yameen had imposed a 45-day emergency in which thousands of political opponents were arrested. That included his half-brother Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, who ruled the country for 30 years until the transition to democracy.

Mr Solih, who beat Mr Yameen with a possible 58.3 per cent of the vote (the results will be verified only next week), represents the Maldivian Democratic Party, founded by Mr Nasheed, who shuttles in exile between the UK and Sri Lanka. Mr Solih’s election represents an encouraging opportunity for India to renew its ties with a nation with which it has enjoyed close historical links. But it is vital that India avoids any display of triumphalism in Mr Yameen’s defeat and crafts a discreet and measured response to the incoming regime, which will take charge in November. For one, India cannot assume a pro-Indian tilt, not least because relations with Mr Nasheed, who will clearly be a major influence on Maldivian politics, have been ambiguous. Although Mr Yameen considered him “pro-Indian”, Mr Nasheed himself had expressed disappointment at India’s failure to help him when he was overthrown.

For another, the experiences of Myanmar and Sri Lanka remain cautionary tales of the limits of expanding Indian influence as a counterweight to China’s “string of pearls” strategy in the region. The Middle Kingdom’s lavish infrastructure spending has enjoyed little popular support in either country, but the sheer scale of investment has meant that a change of regime has not really changed the facts on the ground. Both countries remain tethered to Beijing on account of the huge debt burdens that have been built up — Sri Lanka’s recent handover of Hambantota port to the Chinese being a potent symbol of this relationship. The Maldives owes China about $1.3 billion, estimated at roughly 80 per cent of the country’s foreign debt. This level of indebtedness combined with a sharp slowdown in the tourism economy — ironically on account of the surge in Chinese tourists, which is discouraging visitors from other countries – means that Male cannot afford to distance itself from Beijing or, put another way, tilt too overtly towards India. The balancing act between the two Asian powers will be Mr Solih’s responsibility, but sensitivity to his predicament would go a long way towards helping New Delhi too.