LAC's frozen turbulence

India's option narrows as tension re-escalates

Moves and counter-moves by Chinese and Indian troops around the scenic Pangong Lake in Ladakh over the weekend suggest that three months of military and diplomatic talks, after 20 Indian soldiers were killed in the Galwan valley following clashes with Chinese troops, have yielded little. The weekend’s developments saw Indian troops pre-emptively occupy areas on the southern (Indian) side of the lake to prevent what the military claims are a violation of the status quo by Chinese troops. This purely defensive action by the Indian Army, which may have resulted in a confrontation with Chinese troops — the evidence is unclear — is being interpreted by the Chinese as an offensive action, which they describe as an illegal trespass. This, then, could well mark the early stages of a fresh escalation of border tension. Despite troop morale-raising visits to the region and muscular pronouncements by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh in July, the diplomatic atmosphere appears to have deteriorated. This undeniably leaves India with narrowing options that are, in some measure, of its own making.

At least part of the problem stems from the fact that the government has not articulated any clear policy statement on its position vis-à-vis China. Instead, the relationship has been marked by a high degree of ad hoc conduct, which has ricocheted from an exchange of high-profile visits between Mr Modi and Xi Jinping to a ban on Chinese investment, restrictions on imports, and a whipping up of anti-Chinese national sentiment this year. The new round of heightened tensions — serious enough for the Lieutenant Governor to fly to New Delhi to brief the prime minister — suggests that the policy dynamic is playing out without an endgame in sight. To be sure, it is equally clear that Beijing has chosen to remain obtusely opaque on its own intentions as far as the border issue is concerned. For one, Beijing is yet to share its perception of the configuration of the Line of Actual Control, which clearly differs from the agreement negotiated in 1993. This had added to apprehensions that the Chinese see the line not as the result of negotiation but as a dynamic outcome of facts on the ground.

Having lost territory to a foreign power for the first time since 1962, however, India urgently needs to look for innovative solutions to a confrontation that has clearly become even more asymmetric since the 73-day military stand-off at Doklam on the Bhutan border. Then, the Indian military’s ability to block Chinese encroachments on the plateau served as a bargaining chip for Indian diplomats to de-escalate tensions. Now, despite Indian claims to the contrary, it is clear that Chinese troops continue to occupy territory that falls squarely on the Indian side of the LAC. The internal dissensions Mr Xi is facing within the Communist Party owing to his failure to manage the trade war with the US or initially control the Covid-19 pandemic make it unlikely that he will back away from ground his troops have gained in Ladakh. Just as Mao Zedong chose to make an example of India in 1962 to deflect attention from the failures of his Great Leap Forward, Mr Xi could see China’s military gains along the LAC as a face-saving strategy. India will need to be prepared.