Taming the Dragon: Clear diagnosis but few solutions to India-China tension
Why India must not only enhance its comprehensive national power but also become a major power in China's perception
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Taming the Dragon: A Manifesto for a New Modus Vivendi with China
4 min read Last Updated : Apr 21 2026 | 10:45 PM IST
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Taming the Dragon: A Manifesto for a New Modus Vivendi with China
By Manoj Kewalramani (editor)
Published by Rupa
235 pages ₹595
This edited volume of essays, the editor Manoj Kewalramani, chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution, explains at the start, is intended to be “prescriptive” in nature. It details the strategic challenges and opportunities within the India-China dyad, places them within broader national and geopolitical contexts and recommends specific policy measures for the Indian leadership. In that sense, this book is a guide to actions, written by specialists in Indo-Pacific geo-strategy. Or as the title states, it is a manifesto.
This is where the major difficulty lies, however. The book provides an exhaustive analysis of the challenges that plague India-China relations, especially post-Galwan. The authors have also highlighted the “strategic challenges and opportunities within the India-China dyad”. They have also accurately contextualised this relationship within regional and geopolitical contexts. The book correctly argues, that, “... it is important to underline that beyond history, geography, political mistrust and trade imbalances, there are structural dynamics that are driving Sino-Indian competition” while asserting that, “... any further India-China engagement is likely to be encumbered by low levels of political trust ....”
But the challenge begins when it comes to providing the promised “guide to action”. It is imperative to recognise that a consistently stable India-China relationship is essential for sustained growth and development. Unstable India-China dynamics not only has an adverse bilateral impact but also affects the region. Yet it is tough to overlook the fact that even after 75 years, a better bilateral relationship remains an elusive hope. As the book suggests, this state of affairs is undeniably on account of fundamental problems with the structure of this relationship. Though the two countries have been engaging at multiple levels (barring the post-Galwan freeze), there has been no major momentum towards incremental change. India and China continue to be driven by mistrust and typically talk past each other. They are stuck in a cyclical relationship of cooperation and competition, while the strategic challenges of the unresolved border continue to dictate this direction. The economic and military gap between the two makes this relationship uneven and unpredictable.
Given this backdrop, the fundamental problem with the book is that it provides nothing new or nuanced with respect to policy recommendations, suggested actions or “prescriptions”. Instead, it basically engages with the most obvious solutions that have been oft-repeated by scholars and diplomats alike. Suggestions such as restructuring a new paradigm for confidence building mechanisms (CBMs), building domestic capabilities to manage the growing trade deficit, building infrastructure at the border and pushing more people-to-people contacts are neither new nor innovative. They are the most obvious path to strengthen and manage the new found thaw. Suggestions such as holding “periodic meetings between the Chinese President and the Indian Prime Minister” have been tried and have failed. Neither the Wuhan Summit (2018) nor the Mamallapuram Summit (2019) yielded any major diplomatic triumph.
The fundamental challenge that plagues India-China relations is the lack of trust and the power gap (both economic and military). The book argues that boosting tourism can be a way to build trust. This is a hollow argument. Consider China-South Korea tourism. Millions of people of both countries travel and interact, but the level of genuine trust remains low. However, the book rightly points out that, “The two sides have historically engaged in calculated trust-building, yet their interactions remain overshadowed by a structural deficit of mutual assurance”. The book should have engaged in ways to build and bridge this very “structural deficit of mutual assurance”.
A pertinent question highlighted is: “What then should India do if China refuses to engage in meaningful dialogue?” The book underscores that New Delhi needs to bridge the power gap, only then can there be any genuine interaction and dialogue. Till this is achieved, India will continue to be vulnerable to Chinese “whims”. As the book points out, “... India does not merely need to enhance its comprehensive national power; it also needs to emerge as a major power in the Chinese mind”.
The book does not provide any pertinent insights into how and why India should “Tame the Dragon” or why New Delhi should even engage with this notion. However, it does provide a direction on how to engage and co-exist with a more powerful and belligerent China, a reality that New Delhi cannot change, until and unless it does the most obvious thing: Build its own national security and capabilities.
The reviewer is associate professor, OP Jindal Global University
