Iran war tightens squeeze on India's diplomacy amid shifting alliances

We share centuries of historical ties and cultural affinity with Iran. That should count for something

In 2023, when I attended a conference on Middle East in Singapore, there was a mood of self-congratulation among participants from the Gulf states, the United States and Israel. The region was seen as having achieved a degree of peace and security. The Abraham Accords concluded in September 2020 had enabled the normalisation of relations between the UAE and Bahrain and Morocco and Sudan. There was every expectation that Saudi Arabia would follow suit, as would the remaining Gulf states — Qatar, Kuwait and Oman.  

When the issue of Palestine was raised, the reaction from American, Israeli, and some Gulf country participants was that while the issue had not been resolved, it had been successfully managed. The Americans conveyed that while they would maintain a significant military presence in the region, the responsibility for maintaining security would fall mainly on US allies in the region, with Israel as the keystone. Interestingly, the I2U2 (India, Israel, the UAE, and the US) grouping was mentioned as a potentially important component of regional security. 

On September 29, 2023, just eight days before the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel, the then US National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, had declared that “the Middle East was one of the most peaceful and stable parts of the world.” The string of violent events since, in Gaza, and then in the conflict involving Iran, has proved Mr Sullivan spectacularly wrong. 

Under President Donald Trump’s second term, the US can no longer pretend to be an off-shore balancer. It is directly intervening to change the geopolitical landscape in the region. Change there will be, but not to the US’ advantage. 

This leads one to the US Central Command — Centcom — and the role it plays in upholding security in Middle East. All the six Gulf states — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman — are members of Centcom. Israel was not originally a member because the Gulf and Arab states objected to its presence. It was included, instead, in the US military command based in Europe — Eucom. But once the Abraham Accords were concluded in 2020, Israel was quietly integrated into Centcom in January 2021.  

This implies that practical security cooperation between Israel and Arab states, which are part of Centcom, has been ongoing for some time. They have been integrated into the Middle East Air Defense (MEAD) system led by the US, which operates a network of radars and interceptors throughout the region. During Iran’s retaliatory attacks against Israel in the recent war involving Iran, several Gulf partners reportedly shared radar data or allowed the use of their airspace for intercepting Iranian drones and missiles and to enable US and Israeli attacks against Iranian targets. To claim that they had not allowed the US to use their territories for attack against Iran is not tenable. 

India became an observer at Centcom in October 2020 and stationed a representative at the Navcent (naval wing of Centcom) in Bahrain soon thereafter. India is a member of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) under Centcom, which has 47 members and takes part in the task forces on counter-piracy and maritime security. This allows the Indian Navy to synchronise its activities with Centcom partners.  

This suggests a closer relationship with Centcom than is generally apparent. 

Against this background, India may have had less room for manoeuvre in responding to the Iran war and articulating a more balanced posture. The Iranian official statements on India’s less than supportive stance has been muted but Iranian media has been openly critical. India has been accused of being complicit in the US and Israeli attacks against Iran. It has been criticised for not speaking up when the US torpedoed an Iranian vessel with young naval cadets that had taken part in the Milan naval exercise hosted by the Indian Navy and was sailing off the coast of Sri Lanka in international waters. Though unsubstantiated, Iranian media has accused India of being aware of the plan to attack the Iranian vessel and of failing to prevent it. On Chabahar  Port in Iran, which India has been building as an alternative access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, it is accused of economic abandonment.  In contrast, Pakistan is praised for being a brotherly country, a reliable partner, a genuine mediator and working tirelessly for peace. India-Iran relations appear to have hit a low point. 

The Iran war is leading to realignments among states of the region and India will have to adjust to these changes. The UAE has announced it is leaving the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec), and will no longer observe Opec-mandated production caps on its oil production. This is as much a reflection of its strained relationship with Saudi Arabia as it is of the country’s business interests. The UAE has been openly critical of its Gulf partners for not taking a tougher stand against Iran. It is unhappy about Pakistan’s mediation efforts, which it believes strengthens Iran’s position. India has quickly aligned itself with the UAE. The Indian National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, paid a visit to the UAE, and there are reports of a possible prime ministerial visit in the offing. Unlike in the past, India appears to be taking sides. Whether this will pay in the longer run remains to be seen. 

India’s long-term interests point to the need to urgently salvage relations with Iran before negative sentiments against India become entrenched within the government and people of Iran. Iran is far too important for India to allow relations to turn adversarial. It is a key component of India’s western security perimeter. It remains potentially, a significant energy partner. Whether the conflict continues or a peace deal is reached, Iran has demonstrated its capacity to significantly disrupt and influence traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. This leverage extends not only to Gulf states but also to major energy importers such as India. And beyond these practical arguments is the people-to-people dimension. Here is a country that is India’s civilisational twin, with which we share centuries of historical relations and cultural affinity. That should count for something.

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The author is a former foreign secretary