Can Pakistan's 27th Amendment turn Asim Munir into a new Ayub Khan?

Pakistan's 27th constitutional amendment seeks to merge military command, weaken judicial autonomy, and give Field Marshal Asim Munir lifetime constitutional protection from accountability.

Pakistan’s government has introduced the Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Bill, 2025, with a sweeping proposal that could permanently alter the country’s balance of power. The bill seeks to rewrite key sections of the Constitution, notably Article 243, which defines who commands the armed forces, while also setting up a new Federal Constitutional Court and revising how judges are transferred.

 

While supporters say it modernises command structures and judicial efficiency, critics and political analysts around the world are warning that it could centralise unprecedented power in the military and in the hands of one man — the Army Chief and recently promoted Field Marshal Asim Munir.

 

The amendment has cleared committee stages and now awaits debate in Parliament. 

 

What does the 27th Amendment change in Pakistan’s military command?

 

At the heart of the proposed law is a major reshaping of Pakistan’s military hierarchy. The bill abolishes the existing post of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), and replaces it with a new constitutionally backed position, the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF).

 

Under the new framework, the Army Chief will hold concurrent authority as the CDF, effectively becoming the supreme operational commander of all three services — the army, navy, and air force.

 

The amendment also creates another post, Commander of the National Strategic Command, who will oversee Pakistan’s nuclear command structure. This role will be filled exclusively from within the army and appointed in consultation with the Army Chief.

 

Additionally, the draft gives constitutional recognition and lifetime protection to five-star ranks such as Field Marshal, meaning holders of these ranks cannot be easily removed or prosecuted. Critics say this grants legal permanence to military dominance over other institutions.

 

What judicial reforms does the 27th Amendment propose?

 

Beyond the military provisions, the amendment also proposes establishing a Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), a permanent body that would hear disputes between the federal and provincial governments.

 

The FCC would have its own chief justice, equal provincial representation, and judges serving until the age of 68 — three years longer than current Supreme Court judges. The chief justice’s tenure would be capped at three years.

 

The draft also amends how judges can be transferred. Presently, under the 26th Amendment, a high court judge can be moved only with their consent, after consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the chief justices of the relevant high courts. The new proposal removes that safeguard.

 

Instead, the President could transfer judges on the recommendation of the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP) without their consent. Judges refusing transfer would have to explain their reasons before the JCP and could be forced to retire if the body rejects those reasons.

 

Opponents argue this measure would significantly weaken judicial independence and give the executive and military greater leverage over the courts.

 

What does the amendment mean for Asim Munir’s authority?

 

General Asim Munir, appointed Army Chief in November 2022, was promoted earlier this year to Field Marshal in the aftermath of India’s Operation Sindoor, becoming only the second Pakistani officer after Ayub Khan to hold the five-star rank.

 

If passed, the amendment would give Munir’s position constitutional backing and legal immunity. His command over all three services would be anchored in the Constitution itself, not merely in military regulations.

 

Under the proposed framework, Field Marshals would enjoy lifetime privileges and protection from prosecution, even after retirement. That means any future government or court would face constitutional hurdles in challenging their decisions.

 

For Munir, it effectively transforms de facto control — long exercised by Pakistan’s Army Chiefs — into de jureauthority, enshrined in law.

 

Does this echo Ayub Khan’s consolidation of power?

 

Pakistan’s last major constitutional shift in favour of the military dates back to Ayub Khan’s rule. After taking power in a coup in 1958, Ayub abrogated the 1956 Constitution, declared martial law, and later promulgated a new Constitution in 1962 that concentrated authority in the presidency.

 

Under his system, Ayub served both as President and Field Marshal, sidelining parliament and centralising governance through a controlled “Basic Democracies” framework. His regime blurred the line between military and civilian authority, but it rested on his personal power rather than a permanent legal structure.

 

How is Asim Munir’s consolidation different from Ayub’s?

 

Where Ayub’s consolidation was overt and top-down, Munir’s appears more institutional and procedural. He has not seized power through martial law but seeks the same through constitutional engineering.

 

The 27th Amendment, if enacted, would not merely empower the current army chief — it would institutionalise the military’s supremacy within Pakistan’s constitutional order.

 

By embedding military command and protections in the Constitution, the change could make future reversals far more difficult. Any attempt to undo these powers would require another constitutional amendment, needing a two-thirds parliamentary majority.

 

Political analysts say that while Ayub captured the state from the top, Munir’s era marks a more subtle shift — one where the military embeds itself within the state, making its authority legally untouchable.

 

Pakistan has long oscillated between military and civilian rule, with informal dominance by the army even under democratic governments. But the 27th Amendment, if passed, would mark a historic transformation, turning that informal control into constitutional permanence.

 

Ayub Khan’s authoritarian order ended when he resigned in 1969, allowing parliamentary politics to return. But Munir’s consolidation, which is being built through parliamentary approval rather than a coup, could prove harder to reverse.