Indonesia, the second-largest democracy in Asia, is going through a transition. Last week, the country's election authority announced that Joko "Jokowi" Widodo, the incumbent governor of Jakarta province, had won a five-year term as president, defeating Prabowo Subianto, a retired general. The defeated candidate has been complaining about election malpractices and has one month to appeal against the results. If he is turned down, as is generally expected, Mr Widodo will take office in late October. He will be the first president who will be unconnected with the entrenched political elite in the country.
Indonesia's current political environment, in some important ways, resembles India's. There is enormous popular resentment against cronyism and corruption. An aggressive vigilance institution is pursuing cases against officials for misuse of office, resulting in several senior policymakers serving prison sentences. But the issue is much larger than individual malfeasance. The vote reflects a deeper rejection of the existing political order. Indeed Mr Widodo's appeal and mode of engagement bear striking similarities to those of Arvind Kejriwal. Both succeeded in projecting themselves as new brooms, completely credible in their intent to sweep out the old order. Consciously or unconsciously, both have adopted direct contact, blunt criticism of the power elite and simple personal styles to run their campaigns. This may be a coincidence; then again, it may not.
While Mr Kejriwal's political trajectory is difficult to predict now, it is tempting to draw some implications about the nature of politics and its relationship with economic performance in these two countries. Both were seen as powerful growth engines in Asia during the global boom years. They are now both perceived to be stuck in a rut. Both suffer from dysfunctional governance mechanisms, with all that this entails in terms of cronyism, bad investment choices, inefficient delivery of public services and an entrenched populism in the form of fuel subsidies. Both will enter 2015 with new regimes in office. The actions taken by both governments will be absolutely critical in determining whether these large economies can pull themselves out of their respective ruts. Both offer promise, but also carry risks.
These issues can be generalised for a larger group of emerging economies, many of which are dealing with similar issues - slowing growth and increasing mass frustration with their governments. Brazil's election is later this year. Even before that, it can be said that these economies, once darlings of the global financial and governance communities, have fallen from grace over the past couple of years due to similar factors. Mr Widodo's election sends a strong signal to incumbent governments in these economies that there are strict limits to citizens' tolerance for poor economic performance. To the extent that this is attributed to poor governance, incumbents are at great risk of being displaced - even if it is by relatively inexperienced and untested opponents. A reassuring thought is that, over time, this trial-and-error process must throw up more effective solutions.
