Chinese checks

India needs a more robust response to border incursions

The failure of the 13th round of corps commander-level talks on troop pullbacks in eastern Ladakh on October 10 suggests that India urgently needs a fresh strategy for handling the broader dispute along the 3,440-km Sino-Indian border. Ever since the clashes in the Galwan Valley in June last year, which resulted in fatalities on both sides, the Chinese have steadily encroached on Indian territory along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and despite some pullbacks, the PLA, according to some reports, controls more territory than it did before the intrusion. So far, India’s strategy has been to talk tough, stir patriotic opposition by banning Chinese apps and investment, and augment military resources along the LAC. After implementing the ceasefire agreement with Pakistan in February this year, India has used the troops freed up from that border. In June, it moved an additional 50,000 troops plus fighter squadrons to the area, taking the number of troops deployed along the LAC to around 300,000, an over 40 per cent increase over the year before, along with artillery pieces, while Rafale fighter jets equipped with long-range missiles are prepared for any contingencies that may arise.

This enhanced presence does not appear to have intimidated the Chinese. Although it is unclear how many troops China has deployed in the region, reports suggest the PLA is making fresh incursions into areas it had vacated in the Galwan Valley, apart from attempting intrusion into Arunachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand (the latter multiple times) in the past few weeks. More to the point is the fact that the PLA is augmenting its attack capabilities in ways that could put India at a significant disadvantage in the event of a full-scale war. Apart from consolidating defensive emplacements, the PLA has significantly upgraded weaponry and logistics in ingress points along the LAC, among them Russia’s S-400 air defence system just across Xinjiang and Tibet. India will also receive this system, but only sometime between October and December of this year. The Chinese are also upgrading communication equipment and roads — notably in the Galwan Valley — and have increased the number of patrol boats on its side of the Pangong Tso. It also has three forward fighter bases in Tibet and that can cover the entire border.

All of this suggests a formidable upping of the ante by Beijing and it demands a more robust response from India. The illusion that India’s military options are limited in this region is, in fact, misleading. Past surveys of infrastructure and capabilities on the border have indicated that the Indian military does, in fact, have several strong points along its length and it can exploit them in the same way as China has done this past year and a half. China’s withdrawal from Pangong Tso, the only area it has completely vacated after last year’s incursion, was an example of the Indian army effectively leveraging its superior position in the region to force the issue. All of this, of course, needs investment. That China outspends India by several orders of magnitude is well known. Pressures on the Budget from the pandemic have added to India’s constraints. Engaging in constant negotiations is the most desirable solution to military conflict. But as China has shown, talking and carrying the proverbial big stick work better.