India's dilemmas in Afghanistan

New Delhi should become more proactively involved in the peace process and not shy away from drawing its own red-lines

Even as talks of reconciliation gather momentum in Afghanistan, violence too has surged, underscoring the high stakes for all sides. US Special Envoy for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad is aiming to reach an agreement with the insurgents by September 1 on a road map to end the 18 year conflict, which the American public wants to end and was one of the main election planks of the US President Donald Trump.
 
Seven rounds of direct talks have been held between the US and the Taliban since October last year, which are primarily aimed at ensuring a safe exit for the US in return of the insurgents guaranteeing that Afghan territory won’t be used by foreign militants and won’t pose a security threat to the rest of the world. The latest round of talks in Doha was considered to be “most productive” and there is a new momentum in these negotiations after months of stalemate. Washington continues to insist that it is seeking a “comprehensive peace agreement, not a withdrawal agreement”, though there are few takers for this sentiment.
 
Earlier this month, the US issued a joint statement with China, Russia and Pakistan, urging the Taliban to agree to a ceasefire and begin talks with the elected government in Kabul to usher in an era of peace and stability in the war-ravaged country. More significantly, these powers “welcomed” the involvement of Pakistan, the main sponsor of the Taliban, signifying a dramatic shift in American position from one of isolating Pakistan to that of getting Pakistan on board. Meanwhile, Pakistan has been keen to regain some traction with the Trump Administration with which its ties had been in a state of deep freeze. It is hoping that by cooperating with the US in putting pressure on the Taliban to strike a peace deal in Afghanistan, it can mend fences with an increasingly adversarial Trump Administration. Pakistan’s role has once again emerged as central in the unfolding dynamic in Afghanistan. Washington’s long-awaited invitation to Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan to visit the US should also be seen in this light.
 
India has been observing these developments with a sense of wariness as it has not been brought into the loop so far by Washington. It is only recently that the US officials started briefing India after New Delhi made its reservations clear. India’s position of not having anything to do with the Taliban had become untenable. It was only in November last year that New Delhi decided to send two former Indian diplomats “at a non-official level” to participate in Moscow round of talks with the Taliban. More recently, New Delhi has articulated certain conditions that it feels need to be met if the negotiations with the Taliban were to succeed.

illustration: binay sinha

Given India’s stakes in the incumbent government in Kabul, it has called for all initiatives and processes to include “all sections of the Afghan society, including the legitimately elected government.” New Delhi’s fears that marginalisation of the Ghani government would signal the end of almost two decades of hard work by the international community in bringing some semblance of democratic normalcy to the conflict-prone nation. This also allows India to formally engage with the Taliban.
 
New Delhi has also underlined that “any process should respect the constitutional legacy and political mandate.” This is important as the Taliban remain reluctant to commit themselves to broader democratic processes and key aspects such as women’s rights even as they remain committed to their own interpretation of the Sharia law. Finally, it is vital for India that any process in Afghanistan “should not lead to any ungoverned spaces where terrorists and their proxies can relocate.” Last time when the US had departed from Afghanistan, giving Pakistan a free hand, Indian security interests were severely compromised, as a rising tide of extremism and terrorism in Kashmir made India extremely vulnerable.
 
It is not entirely clear how many of these objectives India would be able to secure as Washington is seeking a quick departure from Afghanistan. India’s significant economic and cultural investment would come to naught if it does not do a quick course correction. Earlier this month, the Modi government while allocating around $58 million as development aid to Afghanistan also cut its allocation to Iran’s Chabahar Port to $6.5 million from $1.5 billion. This was a recognition of the changing ground realities in Afghanistan where future Indian role looks uncertain.
 
Many in India will find in these developments a reason to blame the Trump Administration. But that’s a trope New Delhi should avoid. Washington has its own interests in Afghanistan that it is trying to protect. In fact, it is likely that in the process, it would safeguard some Indian equities in Afghanistan as well, as — with or without Afghanistan— the US needs India to maintain a favourable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. But India’s approach towards Afghanistan has, from the very beginning, been too dependent on the benevolence of others. New Delhi continued to insist that it wants to invest only its soft power in Afghanistan but the fact that it succeeded was due to the American security umbrella. India has done some great work in Afghanistan — in being one of the largest aid givers, in being a major source of cultural influence, in building capacities in various sectors of an emerging democratic polity and in training security forces. But when it came to the crunch, it had to rely on others for hard power projection, even when its own civillains were targeted.
 
For a nation that is looking to be recognised as a leading global power, that’s not a very comfortable position to be in. Being too risk-averse in foreign policy has its own set of costs. There is too much at stake and New Delhi should become more proactively involved in the peace process and not be shy of drawing its own red-lines. After all, India too can play the role of a disruptor if its interests are ignored. This is important to underline not only because Indian interests are involved, but also because the hopes and aspirations of ordinary Afghans cannot be cannot be dealt a mortal blow to satisfy the whims of any single power. New Delhi should make it clear that nice guys need not always finish last!
 

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The writer is at King's College, London