No first use, for us and for all

In my previous column "Towards global no-first use"(November 20), I had argued that as India acquires a reliable nuclear triad — the ability to carry out retaliatory strikes by land, air, sea and under-sea — we must adopt a new approach to our nuclear policy: “The completion of the triad calls for a profound review of India’s policy on nuclear weapons. Now that we are close to achieving credible second strike capability, we must shift focus from negotiating our way through international nuclear weapons control regimes, to shaping a world where these weapons of mass destruction are not used.”
 
I go on to advocate that India persuade China and other nuclear powers and champion a “global no-first use” (GNFU) policy, wherein all the world’s nuclear states declare that they won’t carry out first strikes. Obviously this is going to be very hard. Obviously merely declaring no-first use won’t be enough to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. Yet the GNFU is the only feasible first step in avoiding a nuclear catastrophe, intended or accidental.
 
India is perhaps the only nuclear power that can credibly champion GNFU, because we ourselves are doctrinally committed to NFU. If our commitment to NFU were to weaken, our ability to champion it globally would weaken even more. So it is with some concern that I read a very well-argued piece by Kunal Singh in Hindustan Times that drew attention to the new strains on India’s NFU doctrine.
 
Singh gives three reasons why India’s NFU doctrine must be reviewed. First, India would need to rely on nuclear weapons to counter China’s growing conventional superiority. Second, that Pakistan’s acquisition of lower-yield battlefield nuclear weapons demands India neutralise them before they are used against our forces. Third, that India has access to technologies makes it easier to adopt a first-strike posture today, than 15 years ago, when the doctrine was first promulgated.
 
Let’s examine each argument in turn. First, China’s conventional military advantage is real but can be countered without changing the nuclear doctrine. Not all of its firepower and forces can be concentrated against us — for it has other, stronger, strategic adversaries — so what concerns is the fraction it can dedicate in and around the Indian subcontinent. What this implies is that we must cooperate with China’s adversaries to ensure that it remains engaged in many places elsewhere. What it also implies is that we must take our own conventional military modernisation seriously: Fixing the dysfunctional procurement system and getting out of the fiscal hole of ballooning revenue expenditure ought to be top priorities.
 
In my view, we can continue to manage China’s military preponderance in such ways.

Also, let me be a little naughty here and say that the strategists in Beijing don’t entirely believe our solemn declarations that we won’t use nuclear weapons first. In an earlier column on nuclear doctrine, I had pointed out “any declaration of no first use by one side cannot avoid being seen by its adversary as deception for a surprise first strike. It is the fear of unacceptable damage caused by being at the receiving end of a nuclear attack that prevents either side from using them first. This is the essence of nuclear deterrence.”
 

Illustration by Binay Sinha

Second, should we threaten first strikes to counter Pakistan’s well-advertised readiness to use battlefield nuclear weapons? There is no reason to believe that the Pakistani military-jihadi complex will be deterred from using cross-border terrorists should India adopt a first strike posture.
 
In fact, it would make terrorism a far more valuable instrument. If the space between a terrorist attack and a nuclear attack is reduced, the Pakistani establishment will find it much easier to blackmail us and scare the rest of the world. Instead of ending up in such a situation, it is far better to stick to our current position: That a nuclear attack will invite massive retaliation. It doesn’t matter if the Pakistanis call their weapons “tactical”, “theatre” or “battlefield”— if used against our territory or troops, they must expect certain massive retaliation.
 
Third, the availability of new technology and the modernisation of India’s arsenal does not in itself call for a change of doctrine. Few proponents of first-use are conscious of the costs of a first-strike arsenal and the command and control infrastructure required to manage it. Fewer still are conscious of the arms race this will set off, without commensurate increase in national security or planetary safety. The folly of American and Soviet nuclear strategy during the Cold War ought to warn us against getting onto a slippery slope where nuclear weapons will be abundant, but security scarce.
 
Without doubt, the Indian government must conduct regular, official reviews of its nuclear weapons policies. Academic debate on the merits of retaining or abandoning no-first use are very important. At this time though, no fundamental change is warranted. On the contrary, it is far more in India’s interests to invest in the diplomacy that reduces the salience of nuclear weapons.