On the mend or not

While the strategic side of India-US relations remains largely unaffected by the tariff fluctuations at this time, interviews suggest, any future impact is unknown.

In early February, the US removed a 25 per cent punitive tariff on India for buying Russian crude oil after obtaining “a commitment” from India, according to a US statement, to stop the purchase. India hinted at diversifying energy imports but did not say it would cut Russian oil completely.

Last year, India and the US extended an old defence cooperation agreement for 10 years. They continue to engage in joint and multilateral military exercises. Other dialogues, including security-related ones, are still held, signalling a desire for continuity, Meera Shankar, India’s former ambassador to the US, said. 

“But it is not clear that the new US policy approach towards China gives as much weightage to balancing China strategically and that could create some uncertainty.”

The Trump administration, for instance, has not directly tied its China tariffs to Russian oil. China is the largest buyer of the commodity. Shankar called the India-US Russian oil question “a grey area”.

While India has reduced Russian oil imports in recent months, “there is no confirmation from the Indian government about stopping such purchases, nor have they contradicted the US statement (on India)”, she said.

“I hope both countries can move forward on a pragmatic basis while respecting India’s sovereign right to shape its own policies. A durable strategic partnership must be seen as beneficial by both partners.”

Former chief of the Indian Navy Admiral Karambir Singh (retired) said India-US ties are likely to become more transactional. The Trump administration has introduced uncertainty in the relationship, affecting the bilateral trust built over the years. But for both countries, the communication related to external security is clear — “we have to work together”.

India has recalibrated its position amid the ongoing geopolitical changes, also with an eye on US expectations.

“The China challenge has not disappeared for either the US or India,” Singh said.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad, remains relevant despite a leaders’ summit of the grouping of Japan, Australia, the US and India not taking place last year. India was supposed to host it.

Even so, “people should not get caught up in its security or defence verticals”, as the grouping is providing an alternative to China in terms of public goods for developing countries, he said.

The Quad has multiple working groups, including on healthcare, climate and technology. “The Quad’s functioning is not about manoeuvres and how many ships are there in the open waters — it’s about critical minerals, infrastructure, supply chains.”

Although Trump has introduced uncertainty in the India relationship, Japan, Australia and India are likely to increase their involvement and interactions, so when the US “comes around, the Quad will be ‘back’”, he said.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s recent landslide win in the country’s general election appears to have given her conservative Liberal Democratic Party the mandate to also strengthen its national security policy that includes a hardening of Japan’s China position.

In the past decade of the Quad’s existence, India has been slow to warm to the grouping (initiated by Shinzo Abe, the Japanese prime minister who was assassinated in 2022), also owing to China’s sensitivities. “India is keen on the Quad, but it is cautious,” Singh said.

A question arises: Will China impose strategic costs on India if the Quad is greatly revived?

A multipolar Asia is not in China’s interest, as it seeks to be the hegemon, Singh said, adding that for India, the competition arena is better than a confrontation arena. India and

China are neighbours. Besides, China has moved towards the Pacific Island countries.

India aims to become a $30 trillion economy by 2047, the centenary of its independence from British rule. A lot of India’s commercial activity happens through the Indo-Pacific waters. “We have to ensure the seas are safe for our trade. We need to move single-mindedly in that direction.”

In his State of the Union address on February 25, as the US proceeded with its largest military buildup in West Asia in decades, Trump said he preferred to resolve things with Iran diplomatically but added that the country should stop pursuing its nuclear weapons programme.

A US attack on Iran appeared imminent at the time of writing.

The Iranian government has pledged to counterattack US facilities in the region and close the Strait of Hormuz through which almost one-fifth of the world’s global oil trade passes. Some 40 per cent of India’s crude oil imports and half of its gas imports use the strait. India, which also gets oil from Iran, is under immense US pressure to shut down the Chabahar Port that India has helped to develop as a strategic asset.

Trump wants India to buy US oil instead of Russian. He has said that India and other oil importers could also look at Venezuelan oil after US special forces captured that country’s former president Nicolas Maduro from Caracas in a midnight raid.

“We are already buying American oil, and the Strait of Hormuz is the only way to bring it in,” Vivek Mishra, deputy director, strategic studies programme, Observer Research Foundation, a Delhi-based think-tank, said, adding if Iran disrupts trade there because of a US attack, the situation would be akin to “the US shooting itself in the foot”.

Meanwhile, it will take at least six months for feasibility studies to begin on the potential of India buying oil from Venezuela. According to US experts, that crude oil is heavy and difficult to extract.

With India cutting Russian oil imports (data showed a falling trend since November), Russia is selling more crude oil at lower prices to China (some 2 million barrels a day).

When India-US trade talks restart, the strategic side will pick up, but that never stopped, Mishra said, referring to bilateral defence agreements and military exercises, or geopolitical intelligence-sharing.

“The India-US communication on strategic issues will continue.”

One challenge is that Trump wants India to buy $500 billion worth of US goods over the next five years. India can do that by mostly buying energy, nuclear reactors and aircraft (commercial).

Strategic autonomy is necessary if India wants to achieve desirable outcomes, Mishra said. “It will be a tightrope walk.”