American Maritime Strategy in Indian Ocean: Tracing US' post-Cold War shift

American Maritime Strategy in the Indian Ocean: Dominance, Diffusion, Adaptation 

by Vivek Mishra 

Published by Routledge

202 pages  ₹1,295

  Conflict in West Asia and the disruption of essential energy supplies underscore the critical role of the sea lanes passing through the Indian Ocean region (IOR) and the Persian Gulf. Vivek Mishra’s book promises to discuss the trajectory of dominance, diffusion and adaptation of the United States (US) maritime strategy especially focused on the IOR in the post-Cold War period. 

The major premise of the book is that by the early 1960s, “Britain’s ability and political will to either sustain its dominance in the Indian Ocean or to continue conducting traditional maritime patrols in the region had waned.” This was followed by increased American presence in the region. From initial ignorance, the US approach towards the Indian Ocean became one of active presence. The end of the Cold War also paved the way for US attention toward the IOR as the sole challenger to its power, the Soviet Union, had ceased to exist. Mr Mishra writes that the post-Cold War period “...marked a strategic consolidation of US influence – shifting its posture from episodic engagement to sustained regional dominance.” 

This period also witnessed a change in Washington’s goals vis-à-vis its role in the IOR. Now it moved to “crisis response humanitarian relief, multinational joint naval exercises, nation-building, maritime security, promoting US interests abroad etc.” Increasing trade relations between the US and Asian nations also warranted Washington’s “cautious and compelling involvement” in the IOR. Further, the end of the Cold War brought about a shift in the kind of threats for the US at the seas, piracy and terrorism being two most pertinent. These threats have also forced the US to seek a cooperative and collaborative approach. 

Thus, there has been a rise in bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the US navy and the navies of other Indian Ocean littoral states such as India, Pakistan and Australia. The US has also been working with the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Egypt and Jordan, the other littoral states in the Indian Ocean, where it has military bases. The author singles out India as one of the most prominent engagements.  “India and the United States have institutionalised cooperation both bilaterally and through multilateral platforms such as the Quad, where the sharing of real-time information and technology is a core metric of operational synergy,” Mr Mishra writes. These efforts aim to uphold a free, open and inclusive regional order— one that resists domination by any single power.” 

Globalisation has also called for increasing cooperation at multiple levels. The author argues, “Supply chains and critical technologies, such as artificial intelligence and biotechnology, are becoming increasingly important to emerging nations in the IOR. Therefore, building strong partnerships and democratic linkages in the Indian Ocean will enable the US to maintain its technological leadership and influence”. 

The rise of China has definitely played a crucial role in directing US maritime policies and approach toward the IOR. “China’s assertive posture in the region presents a strategic challenge for the US, necessitating a collaborative, multilateral approach that combines military and economic strategy,” Mr Mishra says. He adds, “For the US, India is the only country that is capable of countering Chinese provocations while maintaining a favourable balance in the Indian Ocean.” The rise in the capacity and reach of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has also pushed the US to renew its focus towards the IOR. Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its “energy strategy is likely to drive more [US] engagement with the Indian Ocean”. 

Though the book paints a detailed picture of US measures and policies towards the IOR during and after the Cold War, multiple aspects remain unexplained and unexplored. Mr Mishra does hint at the need and future role of the Quad, without fully engaging with it. The book is a useful addition to the existing literature, but it is repetitive. It provides a lot of data and analysis but most of the book is dedicated to arguments and developments that occurred till 2010. Much has happened since that has altered the dynamic of US engagement. But the reader has to get to the annexure to gain an insight into the author’s arguments with respect to current developments. As a result, most of the book is just a build-up to how the US changed its approach toward the IOR in the post-Cold War period.  It has, unfortunately, been overtaken by fast-paced events in the past two decades.

The reviewer is associate professor, OP Jindal Global University