SoftBank’s Masayoshi Son, one of the chief financial backers of Oyo Hotels and Rooms, called it the jewel of his fund. His expectation from the budget hotel chain start-up, in which SoftBank has a 46 per cent stake, founded by Ritesh Agarwal was simple: Become the largest hotel chain network in the world in terms of rooms.
Initially, Oyo justified Son’s faith. In 2019, Agarwal with 1.2 million hotel rooms across the world was just behind Marriott in the pecking order (1.4 million) and bigger than Hilton (1.01 million). Since then, however, the hotel aggregator has struggled with heavy losses from poor decisions, Covid-19 and a huge write-down of its China business. A $1.2-billion initial public offering planned sometime next year could test the mettle of the revival strategy that has involved essentially learning from its mistakes.
Oyo’s principal problem was reckless growth. From the time it was set up in 2013, it spent heavily on incentives such as a minimum guarantee scheme to woo hoteliers and invested in hotels’ capex and management. When the pandemic hit, Oyo’s hotel empire shrank, as hotel owners left in large numbers. Its rank amongst top global hotel chains (in terms of rooms) fell precipitously from number two in 2019 to number nine in 2021, according to Hospitality-on.com. And the number of rooms halved (0.53 million).
In March 2019, the last year it disclosed financials, the company announced losses of $335 million, a six-fold increase, 60 per cent of it on account of the hit from China, forcing it to retrench a sizeable portion of its 30,000-strong global workforce. There were reports that SoftBank had cut the valuation of the company sharply.
That was when Agarwal and his team decided to revisit its strategy, talking to hundreds of hotel partners and listening to their tough conversations. The upshot was a major revamp of its business model to make it cost-light and partner-friendly.
First, it replaced the minimum guarantee assurance, a major source of friction with owners, with the more workable revenue-share model in which Oyo receives 30 per cent of the room tariff.
Second, it took on board hotel owners’ complaints that Oyo’s practice of fixing low tariffs squeezed their margins. Now, it would offer an indicative price, giving owners a 20 to 40 per cent flexibility to charge above or below it. In that spirit, it is planning to reduce payment reconciliation time with partners — another area of friction — from twice a week to every day.
Third, it put a stop to the practice of investing in and managing hotels, reducing the cash burn (25 per cent of its Indian hotels were of this nature).
Initially, Oyo justified Son’s faith. In 2019, Agarwal with 1.2 million hotel rooms across the world was just behind Marriott in the pecking order (1.4 million) and bigger than Hilton (1.01 million). Since then, however, the hotel aggregator has struggled with heavy losses from poor decisions, Covid-19 and a huge write-down of its China business. A $1.2-billion initial public offering planned sometime next year could test the mettle of the revival strategy that has involved essentially learning from its mistakes.
Oyo’s principal problem was reckless growth. From the time it was set up in 2013, it spent heavily on incentives such as a minimum guarantee scheme to woo hoteliers and invested in hotels’ capex and management. When the pandemic hit, Oyo’s hotel empire shrank, as hotel owners left in large numbers. Its rank amongst top global hotel chains (in terms of rooms) fell precipitously from number two in 2019 to number nine in 2021, according to Hospitality-on.com. And the number of rooms halved (0.53 million).
In March 2019, the last year it disclosed financials, the company announced losses of $335 million, a six-fold increase, 60 per cent of it on account of the hit from China, forcing it to retrench a sizeable portion of its 30,000-strong global workforce. There were reports that SoftBank had cut the valuation of the company sharply.
That was when Agarwal and his team decided to revisit its strategy, talking to hundreds of hotel partners and listening to their tough conversations. The upshot was a major revamp of its business model to make it cost-light and partner-friendly.
First, it replaced the minimum guarantee assurance, a major source of friction with owners, with the more workable revenue-share model in which Oyo receives 30 per cent of the room tariff.
Second, it took on board hotel owners’ complaints that Oyo’s practice of fixing low tariffs squeezed their margins. Now, it would offer an indicative price, giving owners a 20 to 40 per cent flexibility to charge above or below it. In that spirit, it is planning to reduce payment reconciliation time with partners — another area of friction — from twice a week to every day.
Third, it put a stop to the practice of investing in and managing hotels, reducing the cash burn (25 per cent of its Indian hotels were of this nature).

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