In fight against Naxals, waging a losing battle

Govt's action plan counts on aggressive campaign and deployment of heavy forces to uproot Naxals

On  May 10, two days after Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh announced a major aggressive operation against Naxals, an IL-76 aircraft of the Indian Air Force landed in Raipur  with men and machines.
 
Within an hour, to the surprise of security agencies, the photograph of  machines being unloaded from the aircraft went viral on the social media. While scribes ran after the story, television channels were flashing “breaking news”, beaming special operation against Naxals as soon as the equipment  had reached Chhattisgarh — the country’s worst Left-wing extremism affected state.
 
The story hogging the headlines was not just about the leak of information; the  incident overtly underlined the government’s strategy and unpreparedness in designing and executing the plan to deal with the Naxal issue. The movement, which officials later called a routine exercise, could have been kept a top secret.
 
“This is the biggest flaw that should be avoided as Naxals get ample room to redesign and plan counter strategy when they get to know about our plan,” a senior Indian Police Service (IPS) officer associated with the anti-Naxal operation said. Ironically, on May 8, the home minister himself asserted the approach to tackle Naxalism, underlining that “aggressive” operation against them was on the cards.
 
In the series, the information about shifting the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) command headquarters back to Raipur from Kolkata was also disclosed that was actually not required. Because of “logistical and connectivity issues”, the command was shifted seven years ago from Raipur to Kolkata.
 

A file photo of BSF personnel with guns recovered from cavities in trees in the Naxal-affected Kanker district of Chhattisgarh

The central zone, an operational field formation, was raised on August 7, 2009, and was tasked to oversee deployment of CRPF personnel across the entire Left-wing-extremism-hit states of West Bengal, Jharkhand, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh.
 
The shifting of headquarters would facilitate an additional director general (ADG) rank officer in Chhattisgarh to command the anti-Naxal operation of the para-military force in place of the inspector general of police. It would indeed help in establishing better coordination for operation besides executing the plan “immediately” that was earlier sent to command headquarters for approval.
 
Rebels are ready
 
But experts are sceptical about the results. The development would only help intensify the field operation for which the rebels might have started preparation to counter. The command headquarters and the ADG were posted earlier also. The real challenges, which are manifold, however, lie elsewhere.
 
“The biggest challenge is the urban Naxalite as they fight legally and democratically after finding loopholes in the system,” said Inspector General of Police SRP Kalluri at an academic function recently while responding to students’ queries. The urban cadre is reportedly the brain behind collecting the leaked information and passing them on to the field cadre after preparing strategy accordingly.
 
For the forces, engaging in gun battle with  the Naxals in jungles is easier than dealing with their urban cadre, he added. The urban cadre had been a major problem for the security forces combating the Naxal menace.
 

A file photo of CRPF personnel inspecting the remains of an anti-landmine vehicle that was blown up by Naxals in Madadi village in the Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh

Kalluri, who had put the Left-wing extremism on the back foot during his tenure as IGP of Bastar, had been under the scanner of rights activists. But his attack on “Naxal sympathisers” remains unabated. “A group does not want India to become super power and hence the country has been engaged in internal clash to divert the attention,” he said, adding that the urban network of Naxalites had been playing the main role.
 
During the May 8 meeting, the issue of Naxal “sympathisers” and the urban cadre came up. Maharashtra Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis sought framing of a strategy to deal with Naxal sympathisers whom he claimed to be based in various universities, including those in the national capital.
 
Fadnavis said frontal organisations of Naxals were also a matter of concern. “The propaganda fights are not in (the Naxal hotbeds of) Gadchiroli or Sukma, but it is in the universities of Delhi, Pune, Patna or Hyderabad. They (the sympathisers) are organising strategies for Naxals. An army of Naxal sympathisers is as dangerous as the militant operatives,” he added.
 
Strained ties
 
The relationship between the police and vigilantes on one side and activists on the other has hence touched a new low. While activists say the vigilantes, propped up by the police, are silent on the atrocities committed by the state, the vigilantes, in turn, say the activists are sympathetic towards the Left-wing extremists and ignore their misdemeanours.
 
As a consequence, several human rights activists in the region have been hounded by unfriendly mobs in the conflict zone. Their crime was that they raised their voice against police atrocities against Adivasis. Last year, journalist Malini Subramaniam, lawyers Shalini Gera and Isha Khandelwal, and Aam Aadmi Party leader Soni Sori were not only intimidated and physically attacked, but were also driven out of Bastar by vigilante groups. Academic and activist Nandani Sundar too had to face their wrath.
 
“If the government follows the process and protects the Constitution, there is no issue of clash between the police and the activists,” Sanjay Parate, state secretary, Communist Party of India (Marxist), said. There had been human rights violation that had been endorsed by independent and state agencies, he said. Instead of protecting those violating the norms, the government should take stringent action against them.
 
True, aggressive campaign, shifting of headquarters or deployment of heavy forces would not give the desired results. The government had to simultaneously work on the other fronts; convince the civil rights activists and win the confidence of villagers.  A micro level working was also required at the village level before the troopers could be sent for taking on the rebels.
 
A senior IPS official quipped: “Posting senior official is not going to get results as Naxals do not fear the police more by seeing the rank…had it been, we would have posted a director general.” A proper strategy that too without propaganda was actually required, he added.
 
The government, truly, lacks a holistic strategy. It has been planning an aggressive campaign when monsoon is hardly a month away in Bastar. It is not only difficult, but also not advisable to launch an attack under heavy showers.