India's international canvas

The nation's diplomacy enters a critical phase

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has earned accolades from Western nations for his plain-spoken criticism of the Ukraine invasion during his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the recently concluded Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Uzbekistan. Combined with India’s vote at the UN in support of permitting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to address the UN General Assembly next week, this explicit backing for Ukraine compared with New Delhi’s position in February may reflect a recognition of the military situation on the ground but it also demonstrates India’s ability to adjust its diplomacy to altering geo-political realities. Such suppleness will be tested in the year ahead as it takes over as chair of the eight-country bloc and hosts the summit in September next year. Questions may be raised on the value of this position, given that expected bilateral meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif did not materialise. These non-developments may reveal much about the state of relations with the two neighbours but they could also be attributed to India’s desire to calibrate perceptions, distinguishing its multilateral aims within the SCO from outstanding bilateral issues with China and Pakistan.
 

That said, its membership of the SCO holds several key advantages for India on balance. For one, it offers a platform of connectivity to Central Asia, a crucial relationship for monitoring the security situation with relation to developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It enables India to follow a moderated policy towards this sensitive region, which is part of an SCO-initiated process rather than a unilateral one. Recent history also suggests that India has the potential to play a critical balancing role in a region dominated by China. This, in fact, was the proximate reason for Russia’s support for India’s membership in the SCO in 2017 (the price of which was China’s sponsorship of Pakistan’s entry). To be sure, the changing nature of the Russia-China partnership could alter this dynamic. At the same time, India’s continuing membership also helps New Delhi achieve some measure of geo-political “non-alignment”, given the perception of closer ties with the US, especially via the Quad. Finally, there are substantial economic gains to be derived. The prime minister spoke of closer connectivity with Central Asia at the SCO. These can be developed via Chabahar Port in Iran, in which India has invested heavily and it can be broadened to serve as a regional commercial transit centre, and via the recently reactivated talks for the long-stalled Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.

Overall, the next 18 months or so could be critical for Indian diplomacy. The SCO chairmanship will, after all, be part of a larger international canvas for India. Later this year, India will also become the chair of the G20 and will be hosting the summit in October next year. So one challenge for New Delhi will be establishing a coherent connection between the broad economic and security aims of the G20 with the narrower concerns of the SCO. Much of the developments in both forums will depend on the state of play in the Russia-Ukraine war, demanding agile diplomacy on India’s part to underline its desired credentials as a significant global player.