The thesis that "War is continuation of policy by other means" has been the foundation of military power not only since Clausewitz propounded it two centuries ago but from much earlier. And application of armed force has been its main constituent. To be able to deter potential adversaries, to coerce them when necessary and to subjugate them should that be required, through use or threatened use of military capabilities, has been the 'raison d'etre' of war. Leave aside the wars waged in the last century including the two World Wars. In our own context, Pakistan tried to use military power under the garb of 'Razakars' to wrest control of the Kashmir Valley in 1947 and came close to doing so.
In 1962, the Chinese pursued a limited military option against us ostensibly to establish some boundary claims but actually to downsize India internationally - recall that at that time, our country was viewed ahead of China as a leader of the Non-Aligned movement. Later, in 1965, Pakistan again deployed its armed force, this time more openly, to attain its objectives, again unsuccessfully. Not to be outdone, we ourselves, in 1971, went to war to defeat the adversary through use of military power which reduced the earlier nation state of Pakistan to half its size. There have been other instances of armed force being used, albeit one-sided, to achieve political goals, most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. Whether these actually resulted in the desired objectives being achieved or created unforeseen fallout is a different issue.
Things have begun to change. In 1964, China became a declared Nuclear Weapon State (NWS). By 1974, when India carried out a "Peaceful Nuclear Explosion" it was no longer possible for it to join the club, the Non-Proliferation Treaty having come in the way but for every practical purpose it had acquired nuclear weapon capability. Pakistan was not about to let things be and it was only a matter of time before AQ Khan managed to smuggle in the required technologies and by the mid-1980s, Pakistan had also begun to boast of possessing nuclear capability. This altered the security scene drastically. War, as an option, in the classical sense, appeared to be coming under challenge, at least for those claiming NWS, openly or otherwise; in 1998, this ambiguity was also put to rest as both countries tested nuclear weapons.
Since then, the possibility of any of these three Asian countries waging war on each other, in the traditionally accepted sense, through use of military power, has diminished seriously, possibly disappeared. This does not take into account skirmishes such as those in Kargil in 1999, but the Pak incursions were more acts of subterfuge than war. Recall that the directive to India's military while responding to the scenario was clear - do not cross the Line of Control. Even when terrorists invaded the seat of our sovereign power - Parliament - we could not go beyond mobilisation accompanied by strong rhetoric (then PM Vajpayee's assertion that the time for "Aar Paar ki Larai" had come). In short, the very premise of using war and, consequently, its military element as a coercive instrument of state power, has come under challenge.
Look at what has happened in the last 14-15 years. Fewer than 20 determined fanatics were able to destroy the World Trade Centre in New York and frontally attack the Pentagon in Washington, the centre of American military power. It is unimaginable that this result could have been achieved in war by any adversary. In November 2008, ten illiterates were able to come 500 miles by sea from Karachi, land stealthily at a well-populated Mumbai fishing harbour and attack several high-profile hotels and other targets, killing hundreds of people, something that Pakistan could never dream of managing in a military conflict. Earlier, many had been killed in explosions engineered in suburban trains. More recently, we have seen carnage of extraordinary limits first in Paris and now in Brussels. The perpetrators of these mayhems have been just a few. We are looking at adversaries quite different to nation states. Whether these come from Al Qaeda or ISIS or wherever, the fact is that their numbers are not many and yet they achieve hugely disproportionate results. At the same time, armed forces just stand ready but are unable to do much. Terrorism has brought in an entirely new dimension to the security environment with which militaries simply cannot cope. Use of asymmetric power, state-sponsored or otherwise, will not go away anytime soon and we must learn to face it, but leaderships must also reassess the role that armed forces must henceforth be called upon to play.
Unlike the coercive capabilities that militaries were structured to provide in days that are now no more, coping with non-state actors requires widespread cooperation and exchange of information across the world not just between allies and friends but even with others. In tackling the menace of piracy at sea or terrorism, intelligence sharing through close interface is essential. Even so-called adversaries must come together as we have seen in the Gulf of Aden, with Chinese and Indian naval ships operating together. Take the case of the recent terrorist attacks on the Pathankot air base and our acquiescence to the visit of a Pakistani investigative team, including military officials, to that station; a similar proposal from that country was rejected outright when the Mumbai attacks took place in 2008. Mechanisms must be developed which facilitate such engagement across boundaries.
Yet another facet of new responsibilities is the ability to assist those struck by natural calamities. In earlier wars, navies stormed the beaches at Normandy and Inchon to destroy the enemy, but in 2008 ships went up the beach on Indonesia's coast to bring relief to a ravaged area called Aceh. When internal rivalries result in large-scale disturbance and the need for evacuation of innocents, it is the military's burden to take the lead because they alone have the resources. In issues of surveillance, keeping the lanes of sea commerce open, dissuading pollution at sea et al, armed forces are becoming major players and the term 'Net Security Provider' refers to these roles and not to their involvement in wars.
This is not to suggest that nation states will not need armed forces. It only means that use of military power will encompass a much broader and softer spectrum and focus more on cooperation and assurance than on coercive power. India has made a good start and its defence cooperation protocols with nearly 40 countries are a testament to that realisation. It must also look at force-level structures that permit reach over long distances with ability to transport men and materiel as well as those suited to less aggressive operations even as essential war waging potential is maintained. This is not going to be easy. To rework a national strategy more in tune with the changing environment and to structure military power that will conform to it must be a first priority. It is not certain if this is happening. Simply 'updating' earlier plans and strategies will not serve us well; what is needed is a holistic and de novo examination of the role that military power will need to play in the years ahead. Clausewitz and his dicta need to be revisited.
The writer is a former Director General, Defence Planning Staff. He has served in the National Security Advisory Board
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