After Pakistan's High Commissioner Abdul Basit held a meeting with Kashmiri separatists, despite warnings by the Indian Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh, India has called off the foreign secretary-level talks with Pakistan. The talks were supposed to be held on August 25 in Islamabad and would have been the first official-level dialogue between the Narendra Modi-led government and Pakistan's administration. Avantika Bhuyan speaks to G Parthasarathy, former Indian high commissioner to Pakistan, about the relevance of such talks and an alternative but constructive method that would help improve relations between the two countries
In the past, have these talks helped improve relations between the two countries?
In 1994, the then-prime minister Benazir Bhutto decided to end all talks with India. Diplomatic contacts, however, remained. Ministers and officials of the two countries met and interacted at SAARC and other multilateral meetings. While Pakistan continued its proxy war in Jammu & Kashmir and elsewhere in India during this period, India was gradually restoring normalcy, as Kashmiris were getting tired of violence. This, in turn, led to Pakistani nationals entering the Kashmir valley in the name of jihad.
It needs to be remembered that the Mumbai bomb blasts in 1993, in which over 250 Indians were killed, were executed by Dawood Ibrahim and his followers, [allegedly] with ISI support. These bomb blasts were carried out when a dialogue was still continuing. No such attack took place after the talks were called off. Paradoxically, the Kargil conflict came when there was not only a "composite dialogue process" led by the foreign secretaries, but it also followed the Vajpayee-Sharif Lahore summit. Worse still, the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 followed the Vajpayee-Musharraf Agra summit. It is, therefore, misleading to claim that dialogue helps reduce instances of terrorism.
It was military pressure following the Parliament attack and the American invasion of Afghanistan that forced Pervez Musharraf to declare a cease-fire across the LoC and hold out an assurance that territory under Pakistan's control would not be used for terrorism against India. It was this assurance, which was broadly observed, that led to respect for the ceasefire and the absence of any major terrorist strike on India for four years. The attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul in August 2008 and the 26/11 terrorist strike in Mumbai followed the exit of Musharraf. We ignored this, went back to dialogue at the Sharm-el-Sheikh wummit and paid a heavy price as Pakistan continued sponsoring terrorism and started violating the ceasefire across the LoC. Thus, while dialogue in the absence of terrorism between 2004 and 2007 did lead to improvement in the climate of relations and some useful but inconclusive discussions on Jammu & Kashmir, there was very little progress even then on issues like trade and tourism, which are an integral part of any normal, healthy relationship.
What do the two countries stand to lose if we don't hold the foreign secretary-level talks?
Foreign secretary-level talks can get the relationship moving forward only if there is realisation in Pakistan that terrorism vitiates the climate for any progress in improving relations. This can happen only when the leadership in Pakistan realises that the tap of terrorism on its territory is closed. There is nothing to suggest that the Pakistan army has any intention of abiding by Musharraf's assurances in 2004 that led to the resumption of dialogue. From what one has seen, people like Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, who are proxies of the army, have become more vociferous in their anti-Indian rhetoric in recent days. There are people in Pakistan who desire better ties with India. Sadly, in today's milieu they constitute a small minority. I do not see any possibility of significant progress on any issue of concern or cooperation if the foreign secretaries were to meet at this point in time. We could at best agree to remain in touch.
If there hasn't been any substantial gain from these talks in the past, then what are we not doing right? And, how can we work to ensure that these dialogues are constructive?
There was incremental progress in some areas of cooperation when talks were held between 2004 and 2008. There were also some confidence-building measures around better contacts between armies and trade and travel across the LoC in Jammu & Kashmir. But, on the flip side, the Pakistan army started violating the cease-fire and resumed support for terrorist attacks on India and Indian interests in Afghanistan in 2008.
In the past, the Indian government has allowed Pakistan to have dialogues with separatist leaders. Should India have allowed it this time as well instead of using that as a ground to call off the talks?
I think it was a mistake to allow separatists to regularly meet with Pakistani diplomats and leaders on every conceivable occasion. This has led to unhealthy consequences. There are two levels of Pakistani contacts with the Hurriyat Conference - covert and overt. The covert contacts were evident publicly when we expelled the then-Pakistan deputy high commissioner and three staff members in 2003 for passing on money to a Hurriyat Conference contact.
The overt contacts gave a bunch of Kashmiri politicians, with little political support and given to provoking violence and strikes, an unnecessarily high profile. I think, the Pakistan high commissioner will have to be told that further meetings, as in the past, with Hurriyat leaders will lead to his expulsion under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And official visitors from Pakistan should be told that they would not be welcome in the Capital if they choose to meet with separatists.
