If anything, the National Conferences defining identity was socialism, intertwined with as strong an assertion of Kashmiri identity as the assertion of Maharashtrian identity is in the Shiv Senas agenda or the assertion of Tamil or Telugu or Assamese identity is in the DMKs or the TDPs or the AGPs. No wonder, the National Conference was pitted against the Congress in the traditional pattern of Jammu and Kashmirs politics. The National Conference was predominantly the party of the majority Sunni Kashmiris, the Congress bastion of the minorities in the state "" the Hindus (though those concentrated in the Jammu region divided their votes between the Congress and the BJP), the Gujjars and Backerwals, the Shia Kashmiris and the Buddhists of Ladakh.
After allowing himself to be browbeaten into signing what came to be known as the Rajiv-Farooq accord in 1986, Farooq Abdullah paid a heavy price. Of course, his ineptitude as an administrator between 1987 and 1989 was as much to blame as his political foolishness in allowing the opposition space in the state to fall vacant as a result of the accord. The Muslim United Front emerged to fill that void and, amid an election rigged in panic, the ignominious downfall of Abdullahs second term was written into its flawed inception in 1987.
However warmly one might welcome the remarkable sobriety and maturity of Abdullahs post-victory statements over the past week, one should not lose sight of the fact that he has not adequately learnt the political lesson of 1986. Again for fear of losing, he cobbled together for these elections a much larger alliance of political forces than is going to be easily sustainable in a government that hopes to be cohesive and to have a purposeful direction. Now that Abdullah has brought Gujjar leader Mian Bashir into his party and included Shia leader Iftekhar Ansari in all but name, and even allied himself with the CPI(M)s Yusuf Tarigami and the Bahujan Samaj Party, he will have to balance sometimes conflicting interests and aspirations to an extent that he has not earlier shown the capacity for.
Nor will he have any easy excuse if and when hardliners among his backers demand that he use his two-thirds majority to take greater autonomy for the state by amending the J&K Constitution. Legally, he can now give the state as much autonomy as he wants without any reference to the Centre, since the J&K Constitution is valid under the Constitution of India. No wonder he says the verdict frightens him. He clearly did not calculate in advance how many votes the almost all-encompassing alliance he put together would bring in. He has announced his intention to set up a committee to suggest a suitable autonomy package within a year. Obviously, he wants to put off the autonomy issue.
The euphoria of success and the common purpose of restoring normalcy will most likely make for smooth sailing as long as the rump of militancy gives all the political forces he has brought under his umbrella a common focus "" perhaps for another year or two. Closer to the next elections, though, Abdullah might well be pushed by the exigencies of politics to take a walk on the autonomy path again. In any case, there is a pretty common expectation in the valley that he will once more prove flighty, even irresponsible, once he settles down. He has given no sign that he will prove such fears right, but his third honeymoon with his people is unlikely in any case to last beyond a year. If the administration is seen to be inefficient, Abdullah may be forced to adopt populist slogans to counter the resultant disenchantment sooner than later. The next few months, then, are surely the best time to work out a sensible and perhaps lasting solution to what has, over the last 50 years, been the most intractable of Indias political problems.
An autonomy package, whether negotiated with the Centre or simply enacted by the new assembly, could well pave the way for the next chapter of the valleys saga of secessionism. Even Abdullah does not want the pre-1953 position restored in toto. For instance, he has told associates that he does not want the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Election Commission or the Comptroller and Auditor General to be withdrawn. These are good for the people of the state, he has said. A political package that was labelled as "the pre-1953 position" but really gave the state little more than the titles of Sadr-e-Riyasat and Vazir-e-Azam would only provide the handle for fresh insurgency. If the next generation of secessionists called it a fraud, they would be right. Those Kashmiris who have argued for secession over the past seven years have tellingly cited a long line of similar frauds, a series of unkept or hollow promises.
Essentially, Kashmiris want respect and dignity more than sops and titles "" the power to decide their future, to set their agenda. The historic opportunity of 1996 lies in how well this dovetails with the essential thrust of the confederation of political parties that rules New Delhi today. The UF should welcome the National Conference as not only an associate but as a leading light of the alliance of regional parties. Its leaders should be wary of symbolism or sops. Kashmiris are far more perceptive, not to say cynical, than people in most other parts of India. The appointment of Mufti Mohammed Sayeed as Union home minister, for instance, cut little ice with most of them. Leaders like Saifuddin Soz and others whom Abdullah might depute, apart from Abdullah himself, should be genuinely involved in charting the destiny of India. For, Abdullah would be bringing to bear the power of Srinagar on New Delhi. The Mufti, fairly or unfairly, was seen in Srinagar as yet another of New Delhis agents. The UF should bother with genuinely making space for Kashmiri political involvement at the Centre and leave the perception of it to the Kashmiris.
