The logic of history

At the time of Indian Independence, the princely State Jammu & Kashmir faced an uncertain future. A number of complex forces were operating on its political firmament. There was the National Conference, a party headed by Sheikh Abdullah. It dominated the Valley but had only limited influence in Jammu and Ladakh. It had developed close rapport with the leaders of the Congress, particularly Jawaharlal Nehru; but its equation with the Muslim League was marked by hostility. The Maharaja was yet another force. The relations between him, on the one hand, and Sheikh Abdullah and Pandit Nehru, on the other, were soured by mutual distrust and dislike.

All these actors were soon to play their part in the first act of the tragic Kashmir drama. The Maharaja was indecisive; Jinnah was impatient and Pandit Nehru was caught between his idealism and stark realities of the situation.

The first grave mistake was committed when Maharaja Hari Singh flirted with the idea of independence. The reference of the case to the United Nations was the second major mistake. All these and connected events come out alive through a number of documents cited in Sandeep Bamzai's elegantly written book Bonfire of Kashmiriyat""Deconstructing the Accession. Some of the documents are well-known, others not so well-known and yet others which have not so far seen the light of day, such as the notes recorded by the author's grandfather, K N Bamzai, and D N Kachru, who were on the personal staff of Jawaharlal Nehru.

While the author's assessment of the main actors of the drama staged in J&K during the period 1947 to 1953 is broadly correct, I am unable to agree with his verdict on Sheikh Abdullah: "Despite his so called secessionist intentions, he remained taller than any other leader who walked the Kashmir canvas" (p.226). Undoubtedly, Sheikh Abdullah was a tall leader, but how can his intentions to secede be termed "so called" when there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary?

Clearly, it was Sheikh Abdullah's power game that got precedence over everything else. What suited him at a particular moment was all that mattered. When it suited him, he kept proclaiming that the accession of Kashmir to India was based on fundamental principles and was irrevocable. At the same time, he was sounding out various quarters for support to the idea of having an independent "Sheikhdom". As early as January 28, 1948, he discussed the subject of independence with American officials. This is evident from the note of the same date sent by Warren Austin to the State Department after an interview with Sheikh Abdullah. The report (September 1950) of Loy Henderson, the US Ambassador to India, noted: "In discussing future-Kashmir, Abdullah was vigorous that it should be independent". On May 3, 1953, Adlai Stevenson came to Srinagar and had a long meeting with Sheikh Abdullah. The New York Times, in its issue of July 5, published a map hinting at independent status for the Valley. On July 10, speaking at Mujahid Manzil, Abdullah said, "A time will, therefore, come when I will bid goodbye to India."

All these events and pronouncements, taken together, should leave nobody in doubt that Sheikh Abdullah was dreaming of becoming an independent ruler of Kashmir and the Anglo-US bloc was encouraging him. Having ignored the streaks of duplicity and deception in Sheikh Abdullah's outlook, Nehru was very badly caught on the wrong foot in August 1953, when he found that there was no alternative but to dismiss Sheikh Abdullah.

Even with regard to the Delhi Agreement (1952), for which Nehru was severely criticised in Parliament and other public fora, the stance of Sheikh Abdullah proved insincere. After securing the implementation of what suited him, he virtually backed out. Even Nehru was deeply dismayed by his crafty approach. On June 28, 1953, he wrote to Abdullah: "To me, it has been a major surprise that settlement arrived at between us should be repudiated. That strikes at the root of all confidence. My honour is bound with my words." But Abdullah was unmoved.

It was Sheikh Abdullah's excessive ambition and rank opportunism that spelt his doom in August 1953. A contemporary political analyst rightly observed: "Sheikh Abdullah is a communalist in Srinagar, a communist in Jammu and a nationalist in Delhi".

The tragedy of India with regard to the Kashmir issue has been its inability to understand the mind and motivation of those who held key positions in the state's polity. Rather, India has, more often than not, entertained a vague hope: tomorrow it will be all right. But it will never be right. The logic of history is against it.

The author is former governor, Jammu & Kashmir

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Bonfire of Kashmiriyat

Sandeep Bamzai
Rupa
Price: Rs 595; Pages: 290