Editorial: Bothersome neighbour

The United States’ Central Intelligence Agency has discovered links between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence and the Taliban. All Indians will yawn in response. The surprise, if there is any, is that it has taken the CIA many years to see (or admit) the patently obvious. Meanwhile, Barack Obama says after a brief tour of Afghanistan that stability cannot be brought to that country so long as the Taliban finds safe haven across the border in Pakistan. What a presidential candidate could figure out in a couple of days has presumably been known to the US administration and its defence forces for years. So is Pakistan an American ally, or is it working actively to undermine US policy in Afghanistan?

 

The answer has been known for nearly three decades: Pakistan recognises that the United States cannot do anything in the region without its co-operation, however partial, and therefore exploits its “frontline status” to the hilt by doing as it wills, by its own reading of its national interest. America cannot push Pakistan beyond a point, and therefore decides every now and then that it has to play along: give it conventional arms so that it doesn’t feel the need to go nuclear — even though the conventional weapons become nuclear delivery vehicles; give it aid so that the country doesn’t fall into jihadi hands, even though the aid is diverted to finance the jihadis; wink at the country’s illicit nuclear trade, even while swearing by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Whether delusional or hypocritical, or in “realist” pursuit of self-interest, American actions in and with regard to Pakistan have for decades been at odds with the facts staring the world in the face.

That is why too much should not be read into the current crop of statements emanating from the US about the realities in Pakistan, because American involvement in the region and that country’s need for an operational base in Pakistan severely constrict its room for manoeuvre. The more relevant fact, as far as India is concerned, is that Pakistan has unquestionably decided to up the ante — witness the new violations of the 2003 cease-fire in Jammu & Kashmir, the attack on the embassy in Kabul, and of course the bomb blasts in Indian cities. The question is, why? Is this linked to the assumption of office by a civilian government in Islamabad, and the army therefore deciding to show who is boss? Or because Pakistan has decided that it is not going to get much out of the “peace process” and therefore wants to try diplomacy by other means? The answers can be informed guesses, at best; and beyond a point, the motives are less important than the demonstrated intent. The important point is that India has to rely on its own strengths — military and intelligence capability, diplomatic pressure, internal cohesion and economic clout—to frustrate Pakistan’s hostile intentions.