Strategic partnership” is one of the overused words in our diplomatic discourse. Some years ago, India called Vietnam a strategic partner; that ignored the content of India-Vietnam political, economic, cultural and other ties, and became a minor source of amusement within the New Delhi diplomatic corps. For sure, Vietnam is important to India in many ways, but the “strategic” label is an expression of intent, far from realisation. Yet, we seldom use this label for our immediate neighbours, notwithstanding the fact that Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Iran, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, even Pakistan, directly connect with our strategic interests.
New Delhi has witnessed a succession of eminent leaders; the Chinese Premier and the Russian President making it a perfect score, in terms of visits by the UN Security Council permanent member quintet, all within barely six months. Today’s question is: how might vital relationships be best managed, not just the P5, but also the key neighbours, some of them small and medium states? Are there “best practices” to emulate, based on our experience and that of others?
For any country, the community of world states easily divides into three concentric circles: those at the core of one’s concerns, those in the middle circle that are important to advancing external interests, and those at the periphery in terms of those interests. Joseph Nye, an arch-realist, divides foreign states into those that have a potential to threaten one’s survival; those that threaten one’s interests but not survival; and finally those that affect one’s interests, without threatening them. Whatever yardstick one applies, it is the countries in the first cluster, big and small, that should logically be at the centre of attention.
What are the instruments at our disposal to forge close links with such priority countries? How should one flesh out the skeleton of a “strategic partnership”? What are the things that merit universal application?
One may well ask, is this not “Diplomacy 101”? It is, but improbably, the basics do not always make the foundation of policy. Look at the way India handles immediate neighbours, leaving out Pakistan, which receives vast attention in New Delhi. First, our prime minister has not made a bilateral visit to Bangladesh, Nepal or Sri Lanka in the past six years.
Second, A S Bhasin, assiduous compiler of Indian foreign policy records, has graphically narrated the casual manner in which different Indian functional ministries have simply failed to push forward on bilaterally agreed minutes and memoranda of understanding (MOUs). Bhasin has given examples of minister-level meetings, where, year after year, the same action points were set out, without anyone asking why the earlier agreed decisions had produced no movement.
Third, the ministry of external affairs has arrangements to hold annual “foreign ministry consultations” with a wide swathe of countries, some even with those that one should place close to the outer rim of the second ring of priority states, and yet, none with immediate neighbours.
Rather than carp about what might have been, let us consider the positives, our own and as practised by others, as smart steps that produce strong outcomes.
One, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawarta (2001-06) introduced a number of corporate practices in the country’s public service, including performance measurement norms (some borrowed from New Zealand). Twenty-odd countries were identified as foreign partners of special importance, and over several months, a detailed position paper was produced on each by the Thai foreign ministry, with inputs from all the ministries and agencies involved in that relationship. The focus was on the actions needed over the next five years to strengthen relations, leading to mutually gainful outcomes. This action plan was approved by the Cabinet, and remitted back to all the agencies for implementation, coordinated by the foreign ministry, under the oversight of a special unit in the PM’s Office.
Two, the French have long practised a method known as “ambassador’s instructions”. Every French envoy going on a new assignment receives from the Secretary General of the Quai d’Orsay a document setting out the tasks to be accomplished at that particular post. It is the end product of a process of consultation and collective reflection, involving the envoy-designate, with contributions from the ministries and departments having significant interests in that country. Within six months of taking up the post, the ambassador returns to the Secretary General with his “plan of action” to execute the instructions, requesting additional resources, as needed. Thereafter, during the envoy’s term, implementation is tracked through annual programmes, work-plans for individuals and timelines. The method has the merit of tying resources to objectives.
Three, in 1991-92, India and Germany jointly developed the modern version of the “eminent person” group, an empowered mechanism for annual review of bilateral ties by non-official public figures, reporting back to the leaders of the two countries. Countries enjoying exceptional relations have long used such methods. Ours was the first experiment at bringing in businessmen, academics, scientists, plus cultural, media and other public figures (usually 10 to 15 on each side) in a single intense conversation, held over a day-and-half, to produce do-able action suggestions (Ke‘EP’ up the good work, Business Standard, August 20, 2002). This method is now being used by several other pairs of countries.
Four, the Indo-British Partnership, established in 1993 under the sponsorship of the Indian and British prime ministers, by the Confederation of Indian Industries and its UK counterpart, the Confederation of British Industry, produced a balanced set of month-by-month actions, putting counterpart industry segments into close exchanges, overcoming gaps in information. It produced an unprecedented surge in trade and investments.
Such measures produce a surge in ground-level activities, breathing life into the pronouncements of leaders at bilateral summits. All these actors, especially the economic ministries, must be harnessed to advance our interests overseas, across a broad front. That is what inclusive, proactive diplomacy is all about, moving beyond slogans.
The writer is a former diplomat, teacher and writer
