The Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI’s) Committee on Comprehensive Access to Financial Services (2013) had set modest targets. Ten years on, considerable progress has been made on the payments front, but on other targets, there has been limited progress. These include access to credit (minimum 50 per cent credit-to-district-GDP); savings and investment products with reasonable returns (65 per cent); and insurance and risk management instruments (80 per cent).
At 50 per cent, the overall credit-to-GDP ratio remains unchanged from 2013; in China and Thailand, it has reached 180 per cent and 160 per cent, respectively. Not only is this inadequate, but since it is also highly unevenly distributed across the country (with interior districts in most parts of the country reporting ratios under 20 per cent), it acts as a critical impediment to growth, equity, and transmission of monetary policy.
While there is a continuing need to make banks safer by sharply increasing the levels of capitalisation in universal banks (including small-finance banks) and reducing their direct engagement in high-risk activities, there is no prudential case for imposing capital requirements on non-bank finance companies (NBFCs) until they get to a size that exceeds, say, Rs 50,000 crore.
As first recommended by the Narasimham Committee, they can partner with banks and aggressively take on the responsibility of serving the periphery and the higher risk of failure associated with breaking new ground. There continues to be a violation of “risk ordinality” in the pricing of loans, with low-risk, low-income borrowers continuing to be charged very high rates, driven in large part by the differentials in regulatory treatment and the “pancaking of capital” in the channels through which they are able to obtain their financing.
Agricultural credit continues to be subsidised through an interest subvention scheme instead of converting these and other agricultural subsidies to direct cash transfers to farmers. This limits the growth of financing to agriculture, dampens its signalling role, and low-risk instruments such as post-harvest financing through warehouse receipts remain underdeveloped.
At 50 per cent, the overall credit-to-GDP ratio remains unchanged from 2013; in China and Thailand, it has reached 180 per cent and 160 per cent, respectively. Not only is this inadequate, but since it is also highly unevenly distributed across the country (with interior districts in most parts of the country reporting ratios under 20 per cent), it acts as a critical impediment to growth, equity, and transmission of monetary policy.
While there is a continuing need to make banks safer by sharply increasing the levels of capitalisation in universal banks (including small-finance banks) and reducing their direct engagement in high-risk activities, there is no prudential case for imposing capital requirements on non-bank finance companies (NBFCs) until they get to a size that exceeds, say, Rs 50,000 crore.
As first recommended by the Narasimham Committee, they can partner with banks and aggressively take on the responsibility of serving the periphery and the higher risk of failure associated with breaking new ground. There continues to be a violation of “risk ordinality” in the pricing of loans, with low-risk, low-income borrowers continuing to be charged very high rates, driven in large part by the differentials in regulatory treatment and the “pancaking of capital” in the channels through which they are able to obtain their financing.
Agricultural credit continues to be subsidised through an interest subvention scheme instead of converting these and other agricultural subsidies to direct cash transfers to farmers. This limits the growth of financing to agriculture, dampens its signalling role, and low-risk instruments such as post-harvest financing through warehouse receipts remain underdeveloped.
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