Save telecom with a reprise of NTP-99
Radical steps are needed to fix the telecom crisis
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If telecom and connectivity are not revived, one of our most successful sectors since liberalisation will be incapacitated.
To fix this devastated sector, look no further than the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government’s action 20 years ago to rescue and revolutionise telephony in India through the New Telecom Policy 1999 (NTP-99). It was before India’s growth story and the mobile phone revolution. The telecom sector had stalled, and some 15 operators were struggling for survival under the burden of high licence fee demands, limited customers, and too much competition, with no money to build out networks to earn more revenues to service their overwhelming debt. That was when prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his team made a bold move, working with industry and professionals to effect what seems in retrospect like magic. They implemented some constructive policies for telecom that set in motion phenomenal growth with vast changes in markets and behaviour.
The situation in 1998-99
The sequence of events began in 1998, when the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) decided to look into the problems in telecom. After considering studies by ICICI and the Bureau of Industrial Costs and Prices, the PMO consulted with professionals within and outside the government, stakeholders in industry and financial institutions, and formulated the NTP-99. While the policies were not optimal because political accommodation was mixed with objective-oriented processes, a fundamental improvement was that government collected charges from operators as a share of revenues actually earned, instead of up-front payments on auction commitments for licences. This was a difficult political decision, because of a mistaken public perception that it was a giveaway to the operators. The government held firm despite being taken to court, and the decision turned out to be clearly in the public interest, as results detailed below were to prove.
Success did not follow immediately, because the government’s share was set too high initially. However, two developments in 2004 changed the trajectory. Government’s share of revenues was lowered to 8 per cent of revenues, and “calling party pays” was introduced for users, as against both caller and receiver having to pay for a call. This boosted supply as well as demand, resulting in explosive growth in mobile telephony (see Chart 1), making India among the fastest growing and most attractive markets. In hindsight, government collected far more through revenue-sharing than the auction commitments, as shown in Chart 2. Knowing this, it is incomprehensible that governments haven’t built the sector to improve government revenues, instead of bleeding it to the point of collapse .
To fix this devastated sector, look no further than the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government’s action 20 years ago to rescue and revolutionise telephony in India through the New Telecom Policy 1999 (NTP-99). It was before India’s growth story and the mobile phone revolution. The telecom sector had stalled, and some 15 operators were struggling for survival under the burden of high licence fee demands, limited customers, and too much competition, with no money to build out networks to earn more revenues to service their overwhelming debt. That was when prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his team made a bold move, working with industry and professionals to effect what seems in retrospect like magic. They implemented some constructive policies for telecom that set in motion phenomenal growth with vast changes in markets and behaviour.
The situation in 1998-99
The sequence of events began in 1998, when the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) decided to look into the problems in telecom. After considering studies by ICICI and the Bureau of Industrial Costs and Prices, the PMO consulted with professionals within and outside the government, stakeholders in industry and financial institutions, and formulated the NTP-99. While the policies were not optimal because political accommodation was mixed with objective-oriented processes, a fundamental improvement was that government collected charges from operators as a share of revenues actually earned, instead of up-front payments on auction commitments for licences. This was a difficult political decision, because of a mistaken public perception that it was a giveaway to the operators. The government held firm despite being taken to court, and the decision turned out to be clearly in the public interest, as results detailed below were to prove.
Success did not follow immediately, because the government’s share was set too high initially. However, two developments in 2004 changed the trajectory. Government’s share of revenues was lowered to 8 per cent of revenues, and “calling party pays” was introduced for users, as against both caller and receiver having to pay for a call. This boosted supply as well as demand, resulting in explosive growth in mobile telephony (see Chart 1), making India among the fastest growing and most attractive markets. In hindsight, government collected far more through revenue-sharing than the auction commitments, as shown in Chart 2. Knowing this, it is incomprehensible that governments haven’t built the sector to improve government revenues, instead of bleeding it to the point of collapse .
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