Pakistan’s decision to approach the World Bank for appointing a neutral adjudicator for the controversial Kishenganga hydropower project on the Jhelum appears to be a tactical move designed to further delay a scheme that can spur economic development in the region. The project, started in 1994 on the Kishenganga, a tributary of the Jhelum known as Neelum in Pakistan, envisages the production of 330 Mw of hydroelectricity for power-starved Jammu and Kashmir. It has been dragged into needless controversy right from the beginning by Pakistan, which subsequently decided to put up its own 990-Mw hydropower plant on the same river. Pakistan’s move on the Kishenganga is, in a way, a repeat of its similar but unsuccessful bid to stall the 900-Mw Baglihar power project on the Chenab in Jammu and Kashmir. That project went through after the World Bank-nominated neutral expert, Raymond Lafitte, more or less upheld the Indian stand, suggesting only a minor modification in the project design.
Refusing to learn from this experience, Pakistan has raised a similar objection with regard to the Kishenganga project, arguing that the installation of the power plant would obstruct the flow of water in the Jhelum, thus violating the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan on river-water sharing. This objection is prima facie untenable as India has already given up the original plan of diverting water into Wullar Lake through a tunnel, and has now converted the Kishenganga project into a run-of-the-river project for producing hydroelectricity. Such non-consumptive use of water is entirely permissible under the Indus Treaty. The inordinate delay in the implementation of this project has already escalated its cost by some 68 per cent, to Rs 3,700 crore. Besides, it has denied much-needed power to the underdeveloped Kishenganga valley, which is separated from the Kashmir valley by the mountain range running west from the Zoji La pass.
Hurdles in the way of vital developmental projects, put up by Pakistan through frivolous and unsustainable objections despite frequent meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission that has been set up under the Treaty for speedy dispute settlement, show that the Treaty has not worked as intended. This is borne out also by Pakistan’s refusal to budge even in instances in which India has expressed its willingness to address objections by modifying projects. The time has, therefore, come for India to expose the disabilities of the nearly 50-year-old Indus Treaty and ask for its review. Brokered by the World Bank, this treaty was based on the simplistic formula of distributing rivers, instead of river waters, between the two riparian nations. Of the six rivers that originated in India and flowed into Pakistan, three west-flowing ones (Indus, Chenab and Jhelum) were allocated to Pakistan and the three east-flowing ones (Ravi, Sutlej and Beas) given to India. This was done regardless of the amount of flows in these river systems and the legitimate requirement of the command areas of these rivers. A fresh treaty, in place of the outmoded Indus Treaty, needs to fix the share of the available waters in the river systems, keeping such parameters in view.
