Ias Officers Have Been Playing Mischief

Q: What prompted you to write the dissent note?

A: I would like to make one point clear that there is a lot in the report that I agree with. Like the need for a 30 per cent reduction over a 10 year period, the reorganisation of the various ministries, which should cut down drastically the number of secretary level posts, and other suggestions given in the context of optimisation.

The commission operated with only the three of us sitting in on the meetings. It was not that, invariably, when I criticised something that criticism would still hold at the end of the discussions. I may have started with something and others may have offered arguments against it, so that I changed my position. What has been included in the body of the report is essentially the end result of all those discussions and the various compromises agreed on. But on certain things we decided to disagree. Those are the ones reflected in the note of dissent.

 

On certain things, the data made available was not sufficient to make reasonably reliable estimates of the implications. For example, to the various pensionary benefits that have been given for different classes of pensioners. If you want to work out the financial implications, you need the data of the stock of all the past pensioners by categories and according to pension slabs. That data, to the best of my knowledge, doesnt exist. Aggregate numbers were available, but you need data on size distribution of pension slabs and types of pensions. It would seem that information storage and retrieval is not in good shape. The pension office has information on what pensionary benefits have been received by people who have retired over the last four or five years. Not the stock.

Second, when information about current employees does exist, and we are upgrading the post to create one that did not exist, the direct implications for that particular post were worked out. But post upgradation entails an increase in complementary staff. At times details for that couldnt be taken into account.

Third, coming to pays and allowances. There are some new allowances, and there are old ones that have been liberalised. When allowances existing earlier have been liberalised, like the leave travel concession, the liberalisation works out in terms of leave encashment plus travel by entitled class for the concerned official level for instance, joint secretary level and above gets air fare. When liberalisation takes place, the number availing of LTC increases. And in such cases the past is not a good predictor of what is going to happen in the future. The commission is basically trying to work out the financial implications on the basis of the past. There is no other basis on which one can do it. Then additional problems arise because many of the allowances are contingent allowances. When they are contingent, how those contingencies are going to come up in the future cannot be predicted. Consequently, my apprehension is that there is going to be underestimation because of deficiencies of data as well as because of the contingent nature of many of the allowances.

Q: Why 30 per cent and not 50?

A: I am not saying that there is any sanctity about 30 per cent. Only that this is the direction in which we need to go. When it comes to identifying the surplus, that requires a lot more study. Until then we have this ballpark figure, which is directionally right. It is not easy to arrive at a consensus as to who should go and who should not. In order to achieve a reduction then, across the board cutting is the only possible acceptable procedure. Also, unless you cut down at the top, the surplus at the bottom will not become clear because most of the lower level staff is complementary to the upper levels. The suggestions are bound to be contested by the organisation concerned. So to get over that, when you cannot arrive at a consensus in a directional fashion you say across the board reductions.

The point to appreciate is that government employment is segmented into various cadres and inter-cadre mobility and lateral transfers are not permitted. So you already have various rigidities within the system. Given those rigidities, it would only be directionally right to advocate a reduction over a 10 year period.

Q: Did the question of monetising perks come up for discussion?

A: Yes, but it was not readily acceptable for obvious reasons. We are trying to impose uniformities of scales and other things on essentially diverse situations situations in government are quite diverse, there are doctors, engineers etc. If you want to impose uniformity on this kind of a diverse system I dont think there should be any uniformity at all in the long term you work out uniformities in terms of basic pay. And then use allowances to account for differences that cannot be reconciled easily. So that is the way out we were only trying to rationalise allowances to the extent possible. The best procedure would have been to monetise. But as a society we want to maintain apparent egalitarianism, and take advantage of it in discretionary things like allowances.

Q: How did the idea of making allowances tax-free originate?

A: I have opposed that. Their argument was that if you are giving allowances, then you tax the basic pay but not the allowances. I opposed it because that is not the case with other salaried employees. I have argued that Parliament is working out the reconciliation between equity (exemptions) and revenue considerations (tax rebates). Once that is worked out I dont think anyone should get any additional concessions.

Q: What are the various points on which there is total agreement?

A: On most of the points not reflected in the note of dissent there was a fair agreement. The 1:10 ratio between lowest and highest appears in the dissent note in a different context. What they were arguing for is 100 per cent neutralisation, saying that this was necessary because once you take in the minimum to maximum ratio, it should remain intact through the tenure of the Pay Commission. But the 10.6 ratio or whatever it is is itself arbitrary. It has been pegged at the same level as was done in the Fourth Pay Commission, which also doesnt provide any rationale for it. I also strongly feel that the two and a half per cent of the workforce amongst government employees is not the place to serve the equity objective. That is the place where one should get tasks performed as efficiently as possible giving them whatever pay is needed.

To serve the equity objective you have to go down, to the unorganised sector and the poorer amongst the unorganised ones. Past pay commissions had given a particular sanctity to that vertical equity question. For example, when one is talking about the concept of dearness allowance, the argument is that inflation affects everybody equally. And that is why the point system of DA came up you get compensated for per point increase in the consumer price index. It works progressively as you go up in the hierarchy the proportion you get keeps declining. The Fourth Pay Commission related it to the proportion of the salary. But it was still not 100 per cent. So there is a vertical equity reflected in it that has always been respected by past Pay Commissions.

Q: Is there a difference in the way of looking at things between this Pay Commission and earlier ones?

A: This Pay Commission for the first time had the term of reference of optimising the size of government machinery. You cannot fix the salaries without fixing the numbers. Quantity and price decisions have to be taken in a conjoined fashion, not independently of each other. The unions wanted us to talk only about salaries. They had been staunchly objecting to the other term of reference, namely optimising the size of the government.

The numbers even in the IAS have gone up significantly. The number of people with 25-30 years of experience, which was 95 in 1981, has shot up to 456 as of January 1 1996. The people with 20-25 years in service is 633, 15-20 years is 643 and with 10-15 years of experience there were 727. Recruitment in the 1980s increased. In 1984 direct recruitment was 180. No other service has experienced this kind of expansion. The police service has also expanded but not to this extent. Raising the retirement age in this situation doesnt make sense.

We have tried to reduce the entry age into the IAS by two or three years. Currently, what is happening is that the age dispersion is from 23-24 years to 35 years. The age relaxation will continue for SCs/STs etc, but it will now apply to a lower age. For the IAS, two essential examination papers are to be introduced, for they must earn that edge.

Other services have also been unfair at one level, they tend to compare performance marks in the last level of IAS with the first level of the next in the hierarchy. There the difference is very small, but you have to compare the first with the first. And there the differences are reasonable. But IAS officers have been playing mischief because of their rising numbers, generating additional posts or parking themselves in some positions not meant for them. The problem lies with empanellment procedures. We have suggested that one person from outside IAS be on the civil services board for joint-secretary level selections. I am also for fast track promotions, so that later batches have the opportunity to compete with seniors through a contractual arrangement.

Unless you cut down at the top, the surplus at the bottom will not become clear because most of the lower level staff is complementary to the upper levels.