Visit To Accentuate Carrot And Stick Policy

PERHAPS THE most striking aspect of US President Bill Clinton's India visit, beginning March 21, is that other than the so-called rogue states, India is the only country which faces the most extensive and rigorous range of US-imposed technology, entity and economic sanctions for the mortal sin of having gone overtly nuclear nearly two years ago.

This appears all the more incongruous because there is already a feeling here that the US is beginning to modify its policy on India.

The impression gains ground if one recalls the tough-talking by the US in the post-nuclear tests days. President Clinton, on June 11 1998, while addressing the National Geographic Society on the eve of his China visit said: The nuclear threats, excuse me, the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan are a threat to the stability (in Asia) we (the US and China) seek. They risk a terrible outcome. Then came his famous one-liner, Because of its history with both countries, China must be part of any ultimate resolution of this matter.

 

It would be interesting to ask President Clinton, when he visits India next week, if he still believes that China should be a part of the ultimate resolution of the crisis created by the Indian and Pakistani tests.

Two recent statements by his senior officials would give the impression that he does not probably harbour a similar idea now. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said at the Asia Society on March 14: We recognise fully (that) only the Indian Government has the sovereign right to make decisions about what is necessary for the defence of India and its interests. But this is exactly what New Delhi said in its response to the spate of criticisms unleashed by the nuclear powers at the time.

In an interview to a US newspaper, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott went to the extent of supporting the Indian position that it will maintain minimum nuclear deterrent.

Since the entire disciplinary exercise is centred on the premise that India must quantify its minimum deterrent, thus accepting that its threat perceptions are not justified, the two statements clearly militate against the international community's stand and tend to nullify the logic for continuation of US sanctions.

While the sanctions have failed largely to harm Indian economic growth, Washington believes that the carrot and stick policy has served it well politically. Though New Delhi perceives the 10-round Jaswant-Talbott talks on nuclear-related issues as having largely vindicated its stand, Washington apparently believes that it has succeeded in putting the Vajpayee Government on the mend.

The visit would mark an accentuated application of the policy since India-US relations are expected to enter a more extensive and intensive period. The US commitment to the flawed but almost universally accepted CTBT and the Indian determination to keep out of it, certainly ensure the continuation of the sanctions. Only when New Delhi buckles and decides to sign the treaty can the stick part of the US policy be amended.