Spanning two oceans: The India-Japan partnership grows deeper steadily

The visit of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to New Delhi last week underlined the breadth of the partnership between the two countries. India has long viewed Japan as a reliable economic partner, but now important elements of global governance and regional security are equal pillars of the relationship. The two Prime Ministers, Ms Takaichi and Narendra Modi, are supposed to meet annually, and each summit’s joint statement has reflected this deepening. Mr Modi said as much when he stated that the meeting worked on methods to “strengthen regional peace, maritime security and rules-based order”. Japan is only just emerging from its post-World War II isolation when it comes to defence matters, prodded not only by ideological shifts within its electorate but also the fact that its main security guarantor, the United States (US), is markedly less reliable. 

As part of its strategy to recover some of the lost ground — and to contain the ambitions of China — it has sought to build security partnerships across the Indo-Pacific. Earlier this year, it took a major step forward in this respect when it dropped its decades-long moratorium on the export of defence equipment. New rules passed by Japan’s Parliament allow the export of lethal weaponry to 17 countries, including India. This is the context in which the statement emerging from the summit — that both sides would jointly develop defence equipment — should be seen. India’s requirement of more advanced defence-industrial technology at a time when US sources are unreliable, European sources overcommitted, and Russian sources unpredictable means that this is a vital addition to a diversified defence portfolio. 

Security and economics are not, in today’s world, particularly distinct realms. The availability of microchips determines defence preparedness and comprehensive national strength; and cutting off vital inputs such as rare earths (the production and processing of which is currently dominated by Chinese companies) can strangle a country’s economy as well as its advanced defence manufacturing. Thus, building resilience into these supply chains is vital. The Japanese, who were first subjected to an informal export ban on rare earths by Beijing as long ago as 2010, are far more prepared than India from an economic-security perspective. There is much for India to learn in this respect, and thus the frameworks and working groups related to economic security agreed upon are welcome. 

Ms Takaichi, who was elected with a strongly nationalist mandate, will have been predisposed to understand India’s position on security issues, and to work effectively with Mr Modi in particular. She is, after all, the protégé of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who made no secret of his notion that Japan should bet strongly on India’s rise as supporting its own hopes for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” in which the rules based order and freedom of navigation were preserved. It is a more chaotic international landscape than the one in which Mr Abe first conceptualised the Indo-Pacific, in a speech to the Indian Parliament almost two decades ago. But this increased uncertainty, as Mr Modi himself underlined, only makes the Indo-Japan partnership more valuable as a force for stability and growth in the region. It is vital that the government work effectively to operationalise the various agreements that emerged from this summit, and support the private-sector partnerships that were also signed during Ms Takaichi’s visit.