Preventive surgical strikes provide much-needed tactical leverage in dealing with a rogue nation like Pakistan. However, considering the tactical flexibility and options available with the "deep state" within Pakistan, India needs to think beyond the binary doctrine of military and diplomacy. India needs a similar strategy for economic surgical strikes to end the war against terrorism and deal decisively with Pakistan. This is possible only with a multi-pronged strategy - military, diplomatic, technological and economic.
After Uri, the choice for India was "change versus more of the same". At last, India has decided to do things differently. Surgical strikes and a review of the Indus Water Treaty and MFN status are examples of that. India has been measured and methodical in its response so far.
For as long as the two-nation theory has been around, an important pillar of India's Pakistan policy has been that one cannot choose one's neighbours and that a stable and prosperous Pakistan is in India's interest. If India had thought about a stable Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh could have remained just an idea and India may have been facing similar attacks on the eastern side as well! Unlike the US and other world powers, India has been shy of directly engaging with the centre of gravity - the Pakistan army. It is time to flip that doctrine and bring disruptive change in the approach to Pakistan, as India has done in recent times by bringing up Balochistan. It is in fact an unstable Pakistan that is in India's best interest, and India should focus on weakening Pakistan.
India is a global economic powerhouse by any yardstick and its economic superiority over Pakistan is probably comparable to the military superiority that India enjoyed five decades ago. (India's GDP is nearly nine times that of Pakistan's.) India must make economic strategy central to its approach and leverage its economic potential to the full.
As a first step, India must go beyond the symbolism of boycotting the Saarc summit in Islamabad. India must either make Saarc irrelevant by strengthening the already operational bilateral trade agreements with all the other South Asian countries, or must lobby fiercely to eject Pakistan from Saarc. Baby steps have been taken in this direction by putting under the scanner the Indus Waters Treaty and MFN status. However India must go full throttle to withdraw the MFN status and put a stop to all trade with Pakistan through third party routes. Of course, this will come at some cost to India.
India must leverage its economic clout, not just with the US, but also with the MNCs who care about business ethics, by putting no-business-with-Pakistan as a pre-condition for doing business in India. The Microsofts and Volkswagens of the world will see reason and will contribute to a solution to a global terror threat. That the dysfunctional state of Pakistan is the world's most fertile terrorist recruitment ground is not lost on anyone. Pakistan is no different from North Korea and therefore must be treated as such. True, China will be an "X" factor, but there again if India plays its economic cards right, China can ignore India only at its own economic peril, given that China's trade with India, at $72 billion, is nearly five times that with Pakistan.
The attempt to win over the Pakistani people assumes that Pakistan is a homogenous country. Pakistan is not just the biggest exporter of terror, it is also a tinderbox itself, with Shias and Sunnis, Punjab and Sindh, Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith traditions, and the Army and the other institutions pitted against each other. It is a country where anti-India sentiment is probably the single unifying force. Against this backdrop, the Balkanisation of Pakistan is probably the best thing that can happen even for a vast majority of the people of that country and for a terrorism-free world. FATA and KPK will be only too eager to join Afghanistan. Sindh and Balochistan could become Sindhudesh, with a little help. A rather debilitated Punjab is all that Pakistan in the future may consist of. India should extend all moral, material and financial, covert or overt support to the people of these provinces wanting separation from Pakistan.
If Pakistan implodes, there will be worry about the fate of the nuclear button. Whether a nuclear-armed terrorist or a nuclear terrorist state is more dangerous is debatable. It is certain that India will not be alone and other powers, including the US, will be more concerned about it. India should also take a leaf out of the FBI's book (it put a $25 million prize on Osama bin Laden) and offer a reward for the capture of terrorists such as Dawood Ibrahim and Hafiz Saeed, dead or alive. A Rs 150 crore booty will make Pakistanis realise that the reward for abandoning home-grown terrorists is far greater than the incentive to harbour them.
True, implementation of this multi-layered nuanced strategy is no low-hanging fruit, but for long, disproportionate flak for India's inaction on all matters relating to Pakistan has been heaped on the doorstep of politicians. If the military could provide operational plans that do not entail a huge cost, there is no reason why politicians will not take the strategic decision. No leadership, however, will bargain for a pyrrhic victory.
After Uri, the choice for India was "change versus more of the same". At last, India has decided to do things differently. Surgical strikes and a review of the Indus Water Treaty and MFN status are examples of that. India has been measured and methodical in its response so far.
For as long as the two-nation theory has been around, an important pillar of India's Pakistan policy has been that one cannot choose one's neighbours and that a stable and prosperous Pakistan is in India's interest. If India had thought about a stable Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh could have remained just an idea and India may have been facing similar attacks on the eastern side as well! Unlike the US and other world powers, India has been shy of directly engaging with the centre of gravity - the Pakistan army. It is time to flip that doctrine and bring disruptive change in the approach to Pakistan, as India has done in recent times by bringing up Balochistan. It is in fact an unstable Pakistan that is in India's best interest, and India should focus on weakening Pakistan.
India is a global economic powerhouse by any yardstick and its economic superiority over Pakistan is probably comparable to the military superiority that India enjoyed five decades ago. (India's GDP is nearly nine times that of Pakistan's.) India must make economic strategy central to its approach and leverage its economic potential to the full.
As a first step, India must go beyond the symbolism of boycotting the Saarc summit in Islamabad. India must either make Saarc irrelevant by strengthening the already operational bilateral trade agreements with all the other South Asian countries, or must lobby fiercely to eject Pakistan from Saarc. Baby steps have been taken in this direction by putting under the scanner the Indus Waters Treaty and MFN status. However India must go full throttle to withdraw the MFN status and put a stop to all trade with Pakistan through third party routes. Of course, this will come at some cost to India.
India must leverage its economic clout, not just with the US, but also with the MNCs who care about business ethics, by putting no-business-with-Pakistan as a pre-condition for doing business in India. The Microsofts and Volkswagens of the world will see reason and will contribute to a solution to a global terror threat. That the dysfunctional state of Pakistan is the world's most fertile terrorist recruitment ground is not lost on anyone. Pakistan is no different from North Korea and therefore must be treated as such. True, China will be an "X" factor, but there again if India plays its economic cards right, China can ignore India only at its own economic peril, given that China's trade with India, at $72 billion, is nearly five times that with Pakistan.
The attempt to win over the Pakistani people assumes that Pakistan is a homogenous country. Pakistan is not just the biggest exporter of terror, it is also a tinderbox itself, with Shias and Sunnis, Punjab and Sindh, Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith traditions, and the Army and the other institutions pitted against each other. It is a country where anti-India sentiment is probably the single unifying force. Against this backdrop, the Balkanisation of Pakistan is probably the best thing that can happen even for a vast majority of the people of that country and for a terrorism-free world. FATA and KPK will be only too eager to join Afghanistan. Sindh and Balochistan could become Sindhudesh, with a little help. A rather debilitated Punjab is all that Pakistan in the future may consist of. India should extend all moral, material and financial, covert or overt support to the people of these provinces wanting separation from Pakistan.
If Pakistan implodes, there will be worry about the fate of the nuclear button. Whether a nuclear-armed terrorist or a nuclear terrorist state is more dangerous is debatable. It is certain that India will not be alone and other powers, including the US, will be more concerned about it. India should also take a leaf out of the FBI's book (it put a $25 million prize on Osama bin Laden) and offer a reward for the capture of terrorists such as Dawood Ibrahim and Hafiz Saeed, dead or alive. A Rs 150 crore booty will make Pakistanis realise that the reward for abandoning home-grown terrorists is far greater than the incentive to harbour them.
True, implementation of this multi-layered nuanced strategy is no low-hanging fruit, but for long, disproportionate flak for India's inaction on all matters relating to Pakistan has been heaped on the doorstep of politicians. If the military could provide operational plans that do not entail a huge cost, there is no reason why politicians will not take the strategic decision. No leadership, however, will bargain for a pyrrhic victory.
The author is Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh. These views are his own
Disclaimer: These are personal views of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of www.business-standard.com or the Business Standard newspaper
