Permanent elections?

A spectre has been haunting India, the spectre of non-stop elections. Before Indira Gandhi broke the simultaneity of Lok Sabha and state assembly elections in 1971, India had had four election years: 1952, 1957, 1962 and 1967. Since then, it has had 32, of which 27 have been since 1980. The result is that, between 1971 and 2007, there have been 10 general elections and nearly 100 elections to various assemblies. Anyone can see that this makes no sense, because everyone needs a breather""politician, voter, government.

The reasons for doing something about this situation are several. It hugely hampers the national parties, who may have formed a government singly or in coalition with others, because they have to worry about their political interest at the state level. Second, and perhaps as a result, it increases the level and intensity of corruption because one election or the other has always to be funded. Third, it puts pressure on parties in the opposition at the national level but which run governments in the states, to finance elections in other states. And fourth, it places disproportionate power in the hands of a party's lesser luminaries, usually bandits and criminals, because they are influential at the state level. Frequent elections also increase the influence of wheeler-dealers because they manage to deliver money, muscle and other goodies that are needed to win elections.

The result is an absurd form of adverse selection "" whence tainted ministers "" to govern at the national level. The problem becomes more pronounced when there are coalitions everywhere, and uncomplicated single-party rule is in danger of becoming an endangered historical relic.

What should be the remedy? Obviously, it cannot be a five-year guarantee to the government that is formed first. A variant of this was proposed, possibly in a fit of depression because he was a very sensible man, by the late B K Nehru in 1980. He suggested that India should think of moving to a presidential form of government "" a line of thought that has been espoused by the BJP and its predecessor, the Jan Sangh.

Fortunately, that idea came to nothing""India is simply too diverse a country to have anything other than a parliamentary system that reflects the diversity and gives voice to a variety of minorities (linguistic, religious, ethnic, and so on). However, the problem has remained and indeed has become worse. Amazingly, there has been no debate on the subject even though no less than a vice-president has proposed that there should be one.

The starting point of the debate has to be asking the right question, namely, does the problem have to do with the life of the government or of the legislature? If this formulation is conceded, and if it is accepted that governments cannot be given such guarantees, the next question is whether we can guarantee the life of the legislature. Such a guarantee would prevent a state of permanent elections.

The change would require no more than two amendments to the Constitution. One, a fixed term of five years to a legislature, and two, a stricter conditionality imposed on Article 356 so that it can be used only if there is a threat of secession. These two changes, it will be seen, take care of all the likely objections to the idea.

That however leaves open the issue of what happens to a government which does lose its majority. For this also, an answer is available from Germany where a government cannot be brought down unless it is shown that another can be formed.