At their meeting in New Delhi in April 2005, the then Indian and Chinese leaders, Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao reaffirmed the elements of consensus underlying the future trajectory of their bilateral relations.
One, in the new millenium, relations between India and China, the two rising powers in Asia and the world, had acquired a "global and strategic character". They had a convergent interest in adjusting existing structures of global governance such as the United Nations and in fashioning emerging global regimes in new domains such as climate change and cyber security. In declaring a Strategic and Cooperative Partnership, the joint statement issued at the end of Mr Wen's visit stated, "As two major developing countries, India and China acknowledged the importance of their respective roles in the shaping of a new international political and economic order."
Two, in this changed perspective, the two countries could now approach the settlement of the boundary question as a strategic objective at an early date. This led to the important Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Settling the Boundary Question during the visit. The earlier stand that the boundary question should be set aside for the time being while other aspects of bilateral relations were being developed, was now replaced by a commitment to seek an early political settlement. This had already been agreed upon during an earlier visit to Beijing by prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2003 when the Special Representatives mechanism was established to pursue this objective. The Political Parameters and Guiding Principles became the template for enabling an early settlement.
Three, both sides agreed that there was enough room in Asia and the world to accommodate the simultaneous and rapid rise of both India and China. Each welcomed the rise of the other and declared that neither posed a threat to the other.
And, four, each would be sensitive to the other's concerns and, importantly, develop their relations on the basis of "equality". This was reflected in China's explicit acceptance of Sikkim as a state of India, while India adopted a more nuanced position on Tibet accepting it as "part of the territory of China", rather than as an "Autonomous Region of China", which was the earlier formulation. Despite its long-standing alliance with Pakistan, China appeared to accept India's pre-eminent role in South Asia. Mr Wen said as much to Mr Singh on the sidelines of the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit in 2009. China adopted, at least rhetorically, a more balanced stand on India-Pakistan relations.
This consensus enabled India to expand its strategic space by leveraging its improved relations with each major power to enhance its relations with the others. During the first decade of this millennium, a rapidly growing Indian economy was seen as closing the gap steadily with China. India's prompt response to the Tsunami in the winter of 2004-5, demonstrated its considerable naval power and projection capabilities and the announcement of a civil nuclear agreement with the US in July 2005, confirmed India's emergence as a key player in regional and global affairs. This imparted a certain symmetry to India-China relations. This has proved to be short lived.
A decade later there is a new dynamic in India-China relations. China's economy has outpaced India to become five times as large and the gap is still expanding. China is still determined to shape the international political and economic order in a manner aligned to its interests. But it does not see the need to defer to India to support its efforts. It pursues a new type of "great power relations", benchmarking itself with the US. At the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit, China had sought India's support against the pressures mounted by the western countries. The Copenhagen Accord was a last minute deal arrived at jointly between the US on the one side and the BASIC countries, Brazil, South Africa, India and China on the other. Contrast this with the US-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change on September 25, 2015, in which China agreed to a peaking of its emissions in 2030 and the two countries committed themselves to a trajectory that would lead to each having a per capita emission of 14 tonnes of CO2 by the same year. Within a few years, Chinese positions have diverged significantly from other emerging countries, including India. The recent US-China joint announcement of the ratification of the Paris Agreement is a further sign of this change.
In the Chinese perspective, the strategic and global dimension of India-China relations has weakened and bilateral issues have regained salience. In recent exchanges, Chinese academics advise India to acknowledge the changed and "unequal" power relations. China no longer sees the urgency of resolving the boundary issue to enhance the strategic dimension of India-China relations. The Special Representative dialogue has receded into the background even as Chinese activism at the Line of Actual Control has increased. China is now actively seeking to advance its presence in countries in India's neighbourhood, clearly evident in Nepal and Sri Lanka. China's relations with Pakistan have now gone beyond the latter's role as a proxy to constrain India. It is now a part of China's long-term and strategic initiative of One Belt-One Road. Sensitivity to India's concerns has diminished with China not only shielding Pakistan on the issue of cross-border terrorism but also in blocking India's entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The one area that still interests China is what President Xi Jinping has referred to as a "development partnership" between India and China. This could potentially become a new area of convergence as a growing Indian economy becomes a significant opportunity for a China whose economy is slowing and excess capacity continues to mount.
In engaging China, India must understand the changed dynamic in the relations and adjust its own policies accordingly. To restore a semblance of equality in the relationship it is necessary to build up our own economic and security capabilities and begin to close the power gap with China. In the meantime, external balancing through closer engagement and security cooperation with other major powers, which share our concerns over Chinese predilection towards unilateral assertion of power, should remain a key objective.
Shyam Saran is a former Foreign Secretary
He is currently Chairman of RIS and Senior Fellow at CPR
He is currently Chairman of RIS and Senior Fellow at CPR
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