The Nation Is On An Ego Trip

But one must reflect soberly on the implications and the cost that India might have to pay for her stand. There is no doubt that the CTBT is discriminatory. It divides the world permanently into two "" the nuclear haves and the nuclear have-nots. This certainly hurts the ego of our nation which won its freedom the hard way, more so because from day one India has fought its way to have a say in international affairs. On most occasions, India's voice was heard. This was mainly because India was taken as a spokesman of the non-aligned world. But on the CTBT, India is totally isolated. Our 'comrades' in the non-aligned movement have deserted us. Why have we been left alone to fight the battle of the nuclear have-nots?

 

We have refused to sign the CTBT because we want to retain our nuclear option. We didn't sign the NPT on similar grounds. In a sense, this is strictly not in line with the high Gandhian moral posture that India would never make a bomb. In fact, in his Gandhian zeal, Morarji Desai, when he was the prime minister, had announced without the cabinet's sanction that India would never make a bomb. He was forced to retract. Jawaharlal Nehru refused to tie the hands of posterity on the question as he rejected a suggestion made by Homi Bhabha that the stand that India would never make a bomb be put down in the Constitution.

But the notional option which he had enjoyed for so many years has not been exercised till this day. Nor are there definite signs of any plan to exercise the option in the near future. The other nuclear have-nots are obviously greater realists. They know that they don't have the resources to exercise their nuclear option. The nuclear option doesn't stop at making a few bombs. A meaningful nuclear option would imply developing a delivery system, which is a costly proposition. In fact, the main reason for the collapse of the former USSR was that it exhausted itself in the nuclear arms race.

If we do not have the resources in the foreseeable future to exercise our nuclear option in any meaningful manner, then why make such a fuss about the CTBT? There is no point in fighting theoretical battles in today's practical world. International treaties don't bind the hands of a nation for all times to come. They reflect the current balance of power. As the balance of power changes, the treaties become redundant. The Treaty of Versailles did not stop Germany from rearming itself, albeit clandestinely. In more recent times, the final Act of Helsinki accepted the division of Europe and Germany. But it became redundant even before the ink was dry on it. India made an international commitment to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, but wriggled out of it.

This is the history of all treaties. Japan's case is classic. When it was weak it accepted many unequal treaties with the US and Europe at the beginning of the century. But as it gained strength it repudiated most of treaties. This is realpolitik.

Not signing the CTBT may not invite penalties from the US as such. This is so because present-day America is guided more by business considerations than the promotion of its hegemonic ambitions. The real danger is that it has created a false sense of complacency at home. We are making a big song and dance about retaining our nuclear option. But we have no resources to exercise the option. Meanwhile, we are ignoring our security needs. The burden of fiscal correction has fallen heavily on defence spending. The situation has reached such serious proportions that the service chiefs have started violating accepted codes of conduct and are giving interviews to the press saying that the country's defence preparedness was being undermined for lack of funds.

What has aggravated the situation is that the source of cheap arms supply, the former USSR, too has disappeared. Earlier, India used to get arms at half the international price from the former USSR because of its special relationship with Moscow.

We must understand that though the Cold War has ended, the world has not ceased to be a wicked place. From India's point of view, potentially the most dangerous development is the speed at which China is modernising its defence forces. Today, China's intentions may be harmless as regards India, but these intentions can change.

India and China have a history of an uneasy relationship since both the countries have acquired independent identities. North-eastern India is still a problem. It has an ethnic affinity with China, not with the India. China has a great capacity to blackmail India in this region.

But we are a nation of windbags. We are in a celebratory mood. After all, we have said 'no' to the world. But in reality we are potentially weak. If we lack the resources to shore up security, at least we should seek friends who can underwrite our security.

Yes, this will be on an unequal basis. But such a relationship, skillfully negotiated and executed, will provide us with the space and time to stand up on our own at a later date, and ward off the immediate danger of a much bigger humiliation.