Atoms of uncertainty

The recent India-US deal brings in many uncomfortable questions

That India and the United states could conclude a nuclear deal after a gap of more than forty years means the triumph of hope over experience.

For India, it is presented as a non-military, apolitical commercial deal giving precedence to economic factors. But in real world matters economic and political remain indivisible, and much of the commentary has rightly taken note of the big picture. It is not the point, either, that New Delhi has not made strategic calculations but the question is whether it will succeed in the gamble.

It is indeed a gamble because India has sought to accomplish long-term goals of giving fillip to its civilian nuclear sector and leading the way (ultimately) to its being accepted as a nuclear weapons state. The US has been guided by at least one short-term goal: scuttling the Iran gas pipeline to India.

The deal also brings Washington a bit closer to its objective of co-opting India as an ally in the Asia-Pacific region. If it succeeds the nuclear deal, in addition to others in hitch areas including civilian space cooperation, will blunt the effect of several regimes that have been denying technology to India. Especially, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the London Suppliers Group have been insistent on non-nuclear countries (India is still one of them!) acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty if they seek any nuclear or space technology. It is not India's concern whether the US will impress upon its fellow members in these regimes to follow its suit or will go ahead against the regimes' guidelines.

But the deal is not yet a formal recognition of India's de facto status as a nuclear weapon state. Formalising India's nuclear status would require changes to domestic legislation in the US as well as to international treaties and supplier regimes""something outside the realm of possibility in the near future. One is curious, therefore, whether the US has undertaken to deliver more than it can, unless it is prepared to jeopardise the entire non-proliferation framework, which will open a can of worms.

On the other hand, a Republican administration selling nuclear technology "for peaceful purposes" is only expected given the fact that the earlier deal with India in 1963 was the outcome of the 'atoms for peace' programme initiated by the Eisenhower Administration. Be it Communist China or Democratic India, the Republicans will not sacrifice American commercial interests at the "altar of non-proliferation". And how""and whether""the deal gets translated into action will largely depend on the Iran factor.

It will be known sooner than later whether New Delhi will go ahead with the Iran-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline and, if it does, the nuclear deal with the US is likely to become a dead letter.

The deal marks a qualitatively improved phase in the Indo-US ties. The US adapted to Pokhran II much sooner than anticipated and has been working with India to consolidate bilateral engagement. Ironical it may seem that the same nuclear question that was an irritant between the two countries prior to the 1998 nuclear tests by India had become a fait accompli, paving the way for new reference points to strengthen relations.

There remain three questions the country will be grappling with for a long time. First, does the deal with America mean India abandoning its recent efforts for energy security? In addition to Iran, India has been dealing with several countries for long-term oil/ natural gas supplies and most of these happen to be in the bad books of Washington.

Even if one dismisses the talk of "quid pro quo" in the deal as gossip, one need to factor in a situation where Washington finds New Delhi simultaneously "benefiting" from the nuclear deal and seeking oil supplies from Venezuela, Syria, Sudan, etc. This leads to the second question of reliability of the US as a supplier.

India's experience with the Tarapur deal, signed in 1963, was anything but satisfactory. The US gives primacy to its domestic legislation and political mood at a particular time over its bilateral or international treaty commitments.

Normally countries do not enter into treaty obligations that are inconsistent with their domestic laws, or they at least seek to harmonise both. Be it the Tarapur deal or the ABM Treaty, the US would resort to unilateral action. For example, as happened in the past, a Democratic administration may interpret the same deal in such a manner to advance its non-proliferation agenda. What factor in the present deal, then, warrants hope against experience?

Third, promoting nuclear energy is fraught with more uncertainties than the case with 'dirty' fossil fuels.

Translating the "vision" of increasing the share of nuclear power from the present three per cent to around 20 per cent by 2030 involves expanding the current reactors and constructing several more. Has the government taken into consideration the safety and environmental concerns?

Nuclear energy is neither cheap nor clean. Comparisons of per kg yields of coal and uranium, for example, do not count the initial high costs of constructing nuclear reactors as well as disposing the spent fuel. And one major accident in a reactor cancels out all claims of nuclear power being clean.

The world's dependence on fossil fuels is as certain as death but given market fluctuations and environmental concerns, there is a case for other energy sources. Among these nuclear power is over-hyped and other clean non-conventional technologies are at best paid lip service.

Ironically, as with several good policies India followed of late, dividing civilian and military nuclear facilities, which should have been done long ago, will become a reality thanks to the Indo-US deal. Whether one is a pessimist or a realist the fact remains the same. India and the US appear to have entered into a deal in which Washington will not be able to deliver on its commitments and New Delhi may not feel comfortable to reorient its policies affecting its relations with several countries.

(The author is Fellow, Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies, New Delhi. The views in the article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of RGICS or its Governing Council)