Editorial: Now, a Cold Peace

Unnoticed by most people in India, the post-Cold War phase ended last week, to be replaced by what might be called a Cold Peace — which means that the chosen instruments for engagement will not be nuclear missiles but energy supply, economic nationalism and (if push comes to shove) the use of tanks. Although the leading western democracies warmed to a Yeltsin-led Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union (symbolised by Russian admission to the G-7, which became the G-8), they have got steadily cooler as Moscow has flexed its muscles in the Putin era. Relations between the West and Russia have now plunged to a new low in the wake of the Russian march into Georgia last week. Tensions have eased for the moment after Russia started pulling out of Georgia, but will almost certainly be ratcheted up again if the West deploys new missiles in Poland, as planned, or admits Georgia and Ukraine into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato).

 

Russia in turn has become more aggressive in its various stances as soaring oil revenues have increased its financial muscle, with rising reserves and a booming economy making the Russian story a far cry from the financial crisis of a decade ago. Under Vladimir Putin, Moscow has also nationalised resource companies and sent out tough signals to western firms operating in Russia. As another facet of this aggressive posture, Moscow has signaled its own version of the Monroe doctrine, more or less stating that it sees its near-abroad (mostly the breakway, ex-Soviet republics) as its zone of influence into which the West must not intrude. Heedless of Moscow’s sensitivities, the West has done precisely that, and even encouraged leaders like Georgia’s Mikheil Saakashvili to thumb a nose at Moscow. This has encouraged a certain adventurism on the part of Mr Saakashvili, and prompted Moscow to respond in the old-fashioned way — just as it did in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1980) — by rolling in the tanks. When Ukraine got uppity last year, Moscow merely turned off the tap on the gas flowing through pipelines to Russia’s western neighbour, and Kiev got the message very quickly. Indeed, all of West Europe was reminded through this episode of its dependence on Russian gas, and the leading European countries have therefore been keen to avoid provoking Moscow.

When the Russian tanks rolled into Georgia last week, even the Americans quickly discovered that they could offer nothing by way of a military response, and have chosen to hide their impotence by issuing a variety of demarches while also declaring a new phase of non-cooperation with Russia. Short of the military tensions of the Cold War, this is back to the future. Meanwhile, countries like Georgia and Ukraine will wonder if the Nato game is worth the risk of annoying Moscow — which is exactly what the Russian leadership wants them to wonder. In Georgia’s case, the issue was the fate of a secessionist part of the country populated mostly by Russians — which puts Moscow in the wrong if the argument is that national boundaries should not be crossed (India, for one, would not want enemy tanks to be rolling into Jammu and Kashmir merely because the majority of the people in one part of the state are alienated from the Indian mainstream). The problem for Moscow is that its old-fashioned nationalism is not a model that appeals to anyone. In that sense, Moscow will not be winning any friends, or even influencing any people other than those who feel threatened by it. Therefore, this may not have the makings of a successful, long-term foreign policy stance.