Pervez Musharraf may or may not have achieved much domestically in the eight years of his rule (he has done well by the economy, but been a political failure), but he has certainly engineered a change in the average Pakistani’s attitude to India. There is less overt hostility, nuclear weaponisation has meant that the Pakistan army does not fear an Indian offensive any more, and India is less of an issue domestically than either the United States or Afghanistan. It is significant that, in the campaigning for the recent elections, India was not targeted in any significant way, and that the jihadist parties have been rejected in every province of Pakistan — underlining the point that the broad mainstream of Pakistan society is not aggressively Islamist in its orientation. This sets the stage for checking whether the Pakistani state too has changed its positions in any significant way. Interestingly, Asif Zardari decided to go public with the view that the two countries should press ahead with improving relations, instead of waiting for the Kashmir issue to be sorted out, and that the Pakistani focus on Kashmir has achieved little despite 60 years having passed. Mr Zardari has since been forced to backtrack from this position, which points to some of the difficulties in pursuing a declared policy of entente with India. Still, there is no denying that the ground has shifted and that South Asia might end up being a less dangerous place as a consequence.
This is to be doubly welcomed when Pakistan has made a return to democratic rule. The issue in Pakistan therefore is whether the elections will now lead to a stable government. The start has not been promising, since it has taken the two principal parties many days to come to an agreement, couched in the Murree Declaration. However, neither Nawaz Sharif nor Mr Zardari invites great confidence in their ability to lead the country, and the appointment of someone else as prime minister will only mean that the real decisions will be taken in places other than the prime minister’s office. The hard truth is that Pakistani politicians have been found to fall short in the past, and they may do so again. Meanwhile, the Murree Declaration brings with it its own uncertainty, since it signals direct confrontation with the Pakistan president, Pervez Musharraf. This is not a great idea, especially since the two coalition partners do not command the two-thirds majority required to re-write the Constitution and restore to office the judges thrown out by Mr Musharraf. It is also far from clear whether the army, however much it may be willing to let civilians run the government, will stand by quietly while its former chief is challenged by politicians. The passage to a functioning democracy does not appear very smooth.
While pondering Pakistan’s democratic future, it is important to bear in mind that the forces that shape its destiny remain the same, even if the players change. Among the three ‘A’s, the Army retains its position of influence, and this has been sanctified in the Constitution. America retains its strong links with Pakistani generals, and is more interested in stability than democracy per se, especially since it knows that it is the army that controls the nuclear button. As for the third ‘A’, Allah’s forces have been forced to take a back seat. But if the war in Afghanistan were to go the wrong way, even they might get a new lease of life.
Pakistan is now reaping the ill effects of their policy on terrorism. Pakistan currently is under pressure from US. Once the situation changes a little bit you never know how they will behave. It is better for India to be cautious. We should not encourage any economic ties with pakistan in the near future.
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