If one disregards the uncomfortable feeling that the military and the ISI are using the threat of Talibanisation — including the possible loss of Peshawar — as a means of retaining their hitherto unshakeable hold on the Pakistani state, the question of who really is Pakistan's main enemy becomes interesting. India was always the chief bogeyman, and the military establishment and the ISI were able to use real and imaginary threats to their advantage. But things have changed since both countries became nuclear (ruling out any threat to Pakistan's territorial integrity because of an Indian attack). Also, tensions have reduced because of the peace process. The Pakistani people no longer seem to regard India as a major threat. Even their popularly elected government — such as it is, at present — has been amiable, compared to similar governments in the past. There are differences, to be sure, but the old fire and brimstone is missing.

One important element in the mess that appears to be Pakistan — a mess that could be entirely to the liking of the military and ISI — is that the decision-making process in national security matters now has too many order-givers. Thus, even though Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani is the prime minister, where terrorism is concerned the key man is Rehman Malick, the adviser on internal security. He is believed to take orders from Asif Ali Zardari and has, it seems, been issuing contradictory instructions to the army, the para-military forces, the police and even to the provincial government of the NWFP. Mostly, the prime minister is not kept informed.

In all this, there remains the question of the US, which has always been a major player in Pakistan and has traditionally worked to buttress Pakistani security and even its outsize ambitions of the past. In the new situation, Washington must begin to wonder what its options really are, especially if its troops are locked in combat with people on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. As for the jihadi forces, the enemies are all the other players involved: the US, India, the Karzai regime in Afghanistan, and even the Pakistani army as well as all moderate elements in the country. The net result of the multiple players and their differing objectives and targets is that they can't quite decide whom to fight and whom to ally with. If ever there was fluidity, this is it. The one redeeming feature, from India's point of view, is that it is not the main or even a surrogate target; at least, not yet.