MNREGA repeal raises doubts over extra 50 workdays for FRA title holders

An RTI reply says no order has been issued for the extra 50 days of employment allotted to eligible forest-rights holders under MNREGA, raising questions about the provision under VB-G RAM G

The Union government’s decision not to issue a separate order continuing the additional 50 days of employment for eligible Forest Rights Act (FRA) title holders has raised questions about the legal consequences of replacing the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA).

 

An RTI reply, dated October 6, highlights that no such order had been issued under the new rural employment framework. The issue is not simply whether the government will extend the benefit, but whether an entitlement created under a previous law can survive after the law itself is repealed.

 

The Viksit Bharat–Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act, 2025, (VB-G RAM G)which came into force on July 1, 2026, guarantees 125 days of employment per rural household, a 25 per cent increase over the 100 days available under MNREGA. Yet the additional 50 days previously available to eligible Scheduled Tribe households in forest areas are not expressly carried forward in the new scheme. The legal position turns on the earlier government directive, the new Act’s savings provisions, and the doctrine of accrued rights.

 

How the additional benefit was created

In January 2014, the Ministry of Rural Development directed States and Union Territories to provide up to 50 additional days of wage employment over and above MNREGA’s 100-day guarantee to Scheduled Tribe households living in forest areas, on the condition that they had no other private property apart from land rights granted under the FRA. The directive was issued under Section 3(4) of MNREGA. The government intended the additional employment to help households undertake work for livelihood.

 

Section 3(1) of MNREGA guaranteed at least 100 days of unskilled manual work in a financial year to eligible rural households whose adult members volunteered for employment. However, Section 3(4) empowered the Centre or state governments to provide employment beyond this period, within the limits of their economic capacity and development.

 

This provision, though, was discretionary. The distinction is important because the additional 50 days were introduced through an executive directive issued under statutory authority; they were not expressly incorporated into Section 3(1) as a universal 150-day guarantee.

 

The FRA, 2006, performs a different function. Section 3 recognises individual and community forest rights, while Section 4 provides for their recognition and vesting, subject to legal conditions. The Act does not independently guarantee additional employment. Instead, the 2014 directive linked specified forest-rights holders to an additional benefit under the rural employment framework.

Does the new Act preserve the benefit?

Section 5(1) of the VB-G RAM G Act guarantees at least 125 days of employment in a financial year to eligible rural households. Section 5(4) allows the Centre or States to provide employment beyond that period, subject to economic capacity and development. However, this is the enabling provision and does not expressly require an additional 50 days for FRA title holders.

 

The other significant provision would be Section 37, which deals with repeal, savings and transitional arrangements. Section 37(1) repeals MGNREGA and the rules, schemes, notifications, orders and guidelines made under it from the appointed date. But Section 37(2) preserves specified actions taken under the former Act, including sanctioned schemes, employment generated, accrued wage liabilities and proceedings, so far as they are inclined with the new law. Section 37(3) also allows certain existing appointments, authorisations, approvals and administrative arrangements to continue unless inconsistent with the new Act or subsequently altered, superseded or withdrawn.

 

“Section 37(2) of the VB-G RAM G Act, 2025 expressly protects notifications and actions taken under the repealed legislation, provided they are not inconsistent with the new Act,” Ankit Rajgarhia, partner at Bahuguna Law Associates.

 

Therefore, there could be a legal basis for the 2014 directive granting additional employment to eligible FRA title holders to continue to operate. However, since the new Act guarantees 125 days of employment, an express government clarification would be desirable to determine whether the additional 50 days remain available over and above this entitlement, Rajgarha added.

 

These provisions complicate the assumption that the 2014 directive automatically ceased to have any effect on July 1. The question is whether the directive falls within the categories preserved by Section 37(3), and whether continuing it would be consistent with the new statutory framework. The wording of the original directive and the nature of the benefit must be examined individually.

The General Clauses Act and accrued rights

Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, provides that repeal ordinarily does not affect rights, privileges, obligations or liabilities acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed legislation, unless a contrary intention appears. It also preserves certain proceedings and remedies relating to those rights and liabilities.

 

In State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh (1955), the Supreme Court held that Section 6 may apply even when repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject. The decisive question is whether the new enactment reveals an intention contrary to the preservation of earlier rights. The absence of an express saving clause is not, by itself, conclusive.

 

The doctrine distinguishes an accrued benefit from an expectation of receiving work subsequently in the future. A household that had already acquired a legally enforceable claim under the earlier framework may have grounds to safeguard their rights given to them under MNREGA. A household seeking additional employment for a future period, cannot establish an automatic entitlement merely by showing that it received the benefit in previous years.

 

Section 37 of the new Act must also be read with Section 6. Its express transitional provisions may influence how far the general saving rule operates. Neither of the provisions should be read in isolation.

Can the absence of an order be challenged?

The absence of a fresh order does not, by itself, establish illegality. A challenge would be stronger if the government refused to honour an accrued claim, and acted contrary to an applicable saving provisions and against the principles of equality and equity.

 

Article 14 of the Constitution may be relevant if the exclusion of eligible households lacks a rational basis. Article 21 provides a broader livelihood context. In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985), the Supreme Court recognised livelihood as an aspect of the right to life, but with the caveat that this does not create an unconditional obligation on the State to provide work to everyone. Articles 39(a), 41 and 46 also inform the State’s responsibilities concerning livelihood, work and the economic interests of Scheduled Tribes.

 

“The new Act now puts them on the same 125 days as every other household. In effect, others have gained 25 days while FRA households have lost 25, treating unequals as equals in this way is open to question under Article 14,” said Kheyali Singh, associate partner at Singhania & Co.

 

FRA itself recognises the historical injustice done to forest dwellers, and since such households are heavily dependent on small forest landholdings, they were given more days in the first place, Singh added.

 

In Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of India (2016), the Supreme Court analysed the implementation of MNREGA and directed authorities to fulfil statutory obligations concerning employment and payments. The judgment supports judicial scrutiny of implementation failures, but does not decide whether the FRA-linked additional days survive repeal.

 

A court could examine the 2014 directive, Section 37 of the new Act, any accrued employment or wage claims, and the reasons for the government’s inability. The remedy would depend on whether the claim concerns an existing legal obligation or a request for a new policy benefit.

 

This takes us to the question of how the position of the beneficiaries would differ if they had already accrued an employment or wage before MNREGA was repealed? “That depends on which of three groups a household falls into. Households seeking extra days now, the largest group, are in the weakest position,” said Siddharth Nigotia, counsel at SKV Law Offices.

 

The State’s duty to pay unemployment allowance now ends at 125 days (Section 11(3)). So, even if the extra days are restored, no allowance would come with them unless the new order says so, Nigotia added.

 

The RTI disclosure therefore raises a question of continuity in benefits backed by statutory mandate and not merely an operational delay. The new Act permits additional employment, but whether the earlier 50-days benefit continues depends on the scope of the savings provisions and the legal status of the earlier directive. Until the government clarifies that position, the distinction between a preserved right and a benefit requiring fresh authorisation remains a central point of discussion.