In almost every developed country, and in many that are nearly developed, there is now a clear realisation that geopolitical strategy must revolve around a triumvirate: defence, diplomacy and economic development. Each one of these adds to or subtracts from the totality of national power.
Even if one looks at history, every one of the great powers was structured around these three imperatives. Major European powers like Great Britain, Spain and France - and even smaller ones, like the Dutch, the Portuguese and the Danes - were able to spread their power and influence across the globe using three basic fundamentals of power: military strength and the ability to deploy it; clever diplomacy including through trade with local chieftains; and finally their own relatively greater state of economic development. In the 20th century, it was the US which rose to the position of a global superpower founded on these very strengths, even as the former Soviet Union never could. In recent years, we see the People's Republic of China tread this same path.
India's own report card borders on the pathetic. Its first prime minister hardly recognised the need for military power. In August 1947, the Indian armed forces numbered less than 300,000, most of them in the army. Despite a confrontation in Kashmir in 1948, Nehru never saw the necessity of a larger or a more capable force and this number remained unchanged till after 1962 when we fought and lost several thousand square kilometres of our territory to a not very well equipped Chinese army. When this happened, he broke, and just faded away.
It was in 1964 that the political leadership finally decided that the numbers needed serious enhancement, from a 285,000-strong army to a force of 825,000, supported by a 45-squadron (fighter aircraft) airforce; the size of the navy, at around 15,000 then with some 18-odd seagoing warships, was also be increased. We fought a two-week war with Pakistan in 1965 which at best was a stalemate and in the worst case, something of a let-down despite some hype. But, even then, the political thinking remained focused on safeguarding territorial integrity - the sanctity of the land borders - and not on building military power as an integral part of its overall national strength. Diplomacy and foreign policy were proceeding on their own path, essentially that of non-alignment. Economic growth generated no great anxiety; in any event no one could see how it would have any bearing on defence or even diplomacy, save for efforts to get food to ward off the frequent famines that plagued the country. Overseas trade and considerations of ensuring its safe movement were not on the radar.
Then came 1971, and the upheaval in what was then East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. For the first time in nearly 25 years India's political leadership saw the need to interface defence with diplomacy. At one level, the army chief was directed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to prepare for war. At another, her confidante and adviser DP Dhar was tasked to negotiate what later got to be known as the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the bottomline of which was that each country would consider aggression on the other as that on itself; since India could hardly go to the assistance of the USSR, this was clearly a signal to the rest of the world and likely adversaries - read China - that India would not be alone. In the third prong, Mrs Gandhi travelled the world to articulate India's position. The result of this coalescing of defence with diplomacy was that the Chinese dragon could not stir out of its den even as Pakistan was soundly defeated in its own - despite some fuming from the White House. Even then, India's economic potential did not become the focus of attention for its leadership and the leftist orientation of remaining content with the 3.5 per cent rate continued.
With the arrival of Rajiv Gandhi in the mid-1980s, some movement towards economic growth began, but that was soon overtaken by the scandals that soon brought him to his knees; the next three years saw the country tottering on near financial bankruptcy, which is what P V Narasimha Rao faced as he entered the Prime Minister's Office in 1991. For the first time, economic growth became the government's mantra. The global superpower came wooing with offers of security cooperation. We put the post-nuclear blast sanctions behind us and, by 2008, had negotiated an impossible-to-believe Nuclear Agreement in which the US successfully overrode the entire non-proliferation alliance to stand with us. A follow-on India-US defence cooperation framework, much more muscular than its predecessor, was negotiated. Economic growth was averaging a healthy eight per cent. The year 2009 saw the world at India's feet, literally, and all the three elements of national power were in sync.
And, this brings us to 2014 when everything seems to have fallen apart. Economic growth has collapsed. No major defence deals have been negotiated; the $10 billion contract for the Rafale fighter has now languished for more than three years, and that too after being shortlisted. The procurement of American FH-77 guns for the Army through the simpler direct government-to-government route refuses to move, as does the critical proposal to purchase submarines for the Navy. Most laughable of all is the knots in which the establishment has tied itself on the relatively small deal on VIP helicopters; even as we chase the unseen crooks on our side, including no less a person than a former air chief, the Italians have declared their company innocent of any wrongdoing.
The advent of a new dispensation is seen by many as at least a change. The spate of American and other luminaries rushing to India is something akin to what was happening a decade ago, when the three fundamentals were in place. All three are asunder right now. Defence deals remain unfinalised, offers of co-production and technology transfers remain unattended and people supposedly close to the seats of power go about meeting global terrorists and smiling happily thereafter. This total mismatch is worrisome.
Defence, diplomacy and economic development must move together, hand in glove, if India is to ever become a great power. Fortunately we have at the helm of all three, people of great skill and experience; if they do not deliver, India will never reach its destiny. China is striding ahead to superpower status and continuously bemoaning our own fate - and stars - is not going to help us any. As the Bard said, "…the fault dear Brutus lies in ourselves..."
The writer has been a member of the National Security Advisory Board
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