Nearly five years ago, Professor P.N. Dhar who was Indira Gandhi's secretary for seven historic years (1970-77) during her first innings as Prime Minister wrote a two-part article on Bhutto's Deal with Mrs Gandhi at Simla in 1972.
It immediately became the focus of a fierce controversy on both sides of the subcontinental divide. For, it had confirmed authoritatively what was not entirely unknown earlier, that the Simla Agreement was accompanied by, indeed based on, a verbal understanding between Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Indira Gandhi. Under it, the then Pakistani ruler had undertaken gradually to convert the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir into virtually a permanent border a commitment on which he later reneged.
In India, the article revived the criticism that Indira Gandhi had been naive in returning to Pakistan 93,000 prisoners of war and 5,000 square miles of territory in return for a mere verbal assurance by Bhutto that he had no intention of honouring anyhow. It was in Pakistan that the fur really flew. Almost every Pakistani of consequence, with the conspicuous exception of Ms Benazir Bhutto, confuted Prof Dhar, one of them taunting him: Face it, Mr Dhar, even if we accept what you say, Mr Bhutto fooled your Prime Minister.
Prof Dhar has now returned to the subject of Simla, to greater effect, in his superbly written book of selective memoirs. He has, of course, dealt with other crucial topics also; the most important are underscored by the book's title, Indira Gandhi, The 'Emergency', And Indian Democracy, (OUP, Rs 545). Sanjay, in the heading of this review-article, is the shorthand for the monstrosity that Indira Gandhi perpetrated on the country in June 1975. Unsurprisingly, most of the comment on the book so far has concentrated on the Emergency and its disastrous consequences.
However, the chapter on Simla merits attention because of a vital, new disclosure that quite apart from the Versailles syndrome, Soviet pressure had influenced Indira Gandhi's decision to adopt a soft approach to Pakistan. Prof Dhar's own preference was for returning the PoWs but retaining the territory as a leverage to ensure compliance by Bhutto of his commitment. But as soon as he said this to Indira Gandhi in the presence of P.N. Haksar, arguably her most powerful aide ever until his fall from grace she lost her temper.
It was then that Prof Dhar realised that she was under pressure which could have been only from the Soviets. He emphasises that this was only a hunch because I wasn't personally aware of any such pressure. Perhaps Haksar was. Anyone who knows Prof Dhar also knows that discretion, sometimes needlessly excessive, is among his several qualities. He wouldn't have said what he has were he not absolutely sure about the word from Moscow. What followed after Indira's display of anger is revealing. Haksar signalled to him to withdraw which he did. Soon thereafter Haksar told me that he 'had quietened her down'. (p. 209)
As for the Emergency, the author says it was a severe setback in the political evolution of India. In fact, it was a lot worse. The poison that it pumped into the body politic has not yet been fully flushed out a quarter of a century later. Prof Dhar is on firm ground when he argues that the Emergency should not be blamed on Indira Gandhi's flawed personality alone. Instead, there should be a wider search for its political and social causes. He is also right in dilating on the excesses of the extra-parliamentary agitation in the country, such as Nav Nirman in Gujarat, the JP movement in Bihar and much else that Indira was up against. But he does go overboard when he comes close to describing the Emergency as a systemic failure and thus underplaying Indira Gandhi's personal responsibility and motivations f or the outrage that Emergency undoubtedly was.
In a series of brilliant and incisive reflections, his account of the railway strike in 1974 masterminded by today's Defence Minister George Fernandes, with the avowed objective of making India 'starve' stands out. But the fact remains that this strike was put down with the approval of the middle class.
The Emergency became necessary in Indira's scheme of things only because of the Allahabad High Court's judgment and the Supreme Court's predictably conditional stay of it. Once she decided not to step down even
temporarily, she had no option but to lock up her strident political opponents and gag the
Press. Neither of this could be done without suspending the Constitution, including all fundamental rights.
Whether this was done by the then Prime Minister on her own or at the behest of her pampered son Sanjay who soon became an extra-constitutional authority of menacing proportions is immaterial. What matters is that the sinister operation was put through behind the backs of not only the Cabinet but also Prof Dhar. It is, therefore, intriguing that throughout the book the word Emergency is put within inverted commas. What makes this incomprehensible is that Prof Dhar, like so many fine and upright officers, was himself at the receiving end of the Indira-Sanjay raj, as has been described in fascinating detail in the chapter, My Experience of the 'Emergency'.
At one stage early during the Emergency, Prof Dhar was driven to offering his resignation. It was not accepted. Later, there were unsubtle hints that he ought to leave. This he resolutely refused to do, bluntly telling G. Parthasarthy, who had conveyed the idea of quitting, that he would wait to be dismissed.
Prof Dhar has also brought into the open the hitherto unpublished details of his painstaking negotiations during the Emergency with the imprisoned JP, mostly through intermediaries and sometimes directly. Sanjay saw to it that these were aborted.
There is a lot in Prof Dhar's book that makes for compelling reading. For instance, the evocative, and often touching description of his childhood in Kashmir and distinguished career in academia in Peshawar and Delhi, a dissertation on the Prime Minister's Office and reflections on the stress on Indian democracy. In the available space, alas, these cannot be discussed.
Even so, a word must be said about the 30 pages devoted to Sikkim's merger. These should be compulsory reading, especially for those who
persist in describing Sikkim's joining the Indian Union a case of annexation or even smash and grab.
Prof Dhar has taken too long a time to publish this remarkable and welcome book. Indeed, some are saying that almost all of those in a position to confirm or contradict him are no longer around. I have no doubt, however, that he has told the truth, as he perceived it, and nothing but the truth. But the whole truth has not yet been told. Prof Dhar owes it to his readers and to himself to come forth with a sequel volume necessary to fill the gaps.
