Dealing with a rogue state

Events after November 26 might seem to be going along the broad course that was set after the December 2001 attack on Parliament—angry accusations against Pakistan, obfuscation and alternately hot and cold declamations by that country, a ratcheting up of bilateral tension, military mobilisation (though varying in degree), a flurry of arrivals and departures as diplomatic visitors try to keep a lid on things, a slow easing of anger and tension, and eventually some kind of placatory gesture from Pakistan that helps to close the chapter. The last time round, this sequence was even followed by the start of a new “peace process”.

 

But it is not quite deja vu. This time, India’s military response has been barely noticeable though Pakistan has indulged in war talk and some troop movements. The more significant difference is that the anger in the Indian establishment probably runs much deeper this time round. So reconciliation and rapprochement may be ruled out for much longer. History, therefore, may not quite be about to repeat itself, however much it seems that way. While there are limitations to the military responses that India can risk against a nuclear weapon state, there is no shortage of non-military responses available, from breaking off diplomatic ties to taking the Kashmir issue off the negotiating table, and from applying international pressure to deny Islamabad badly needed foreign cash if it does not behave, to creating uncertainty about river water flows. Pakistan therefore may be making a mistake if it assumes that it has pulled off another outrage without negative consequences to itself; the only way in which it can heal deep wounds is if it takes credible action against the guilty elements within its borders—but on the evidence so far, that is too much to hope for.

The real danger is that Pakistan (which means the still dominant army’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency that controls the supposed “non-state” actors) may want to provoke a stronger response from India and therefore embark on another outrage—which would then place virtually unmanageable pressure on India to respond in the heat of the moment. It is possible that Pakistan’s gambit would be to then tell the United States that it needs to move its troops from the Afghan border to the Indian one—action that would send a message to the Obama team that if it thinks it can ramp up the war in Afghanistan, it had better reckon with the risk of losing Pak support. The same message is conveyed by the attacks in recent weeks on western military convoys moving through Pakistan. To the extent that India has not reacted militarily to the Mumbai outrage, except to raise the level of alertness, Pakistan has not achieved its objective of creating a situation that calls for large-scale troop movement from west to east. That can be achieved only with another hit against India.

Even if no second strike is imminent, another terrorist assault is only a matter of time—since there has been one such episode virtually every month through most of 2008. India should therefore be prepared with its responses, and have done detailed scenario-mapping. It should also have improved its preventive posture—the home minister’s letter to chief ministers on what steps should be taken straightaway might have raised some hackles because of its tone, but the suggestions themselves are unexceptionable. It is only through such measures that the country can protect itself and its citizens.