Iraq unravelling

The American game plan in Iraq seems to be coming badly unstuck. Sectarian violence has grown in frequency and scale, and there is talk increasingly of the country heading for civil war between rival militias. The US plan of handing over power to a new national government, under a new constitution, remains technically on course""with the new parliament scheduled to convene next week, and a full-fledged government to be in place and functional within 60 days of that. But even the most die-hard optimist now realises that the transition to a peaceful, democratic Iraq is not going to happen.

At the same time, the mood within the US with regard to the war has turned quite dramatically. From being the single-largest source of support for President Bush, the war is now becoming a millstone round his neck. The war's third anniversary is approaching, it is two years since Mr Bush said his mission was "accomplished", and he has to announce some troop withdrawals in the near future, in order to keep domestic public opinion appeased""just when the situation on the ground in Iraq has got noticeably worse. The dilemmas are obvious, and there is no easy way to resolve them. Mr Bush's approval ratings have therefore fallen to an all-time low, and his own conservative support base has decided that the war was a bad idea and that defeat may now be inevitable. It seems increasingly like a repeat of Vietnam: at some stage the US will declare victory in terms of its objectives having been achieved (in this case: Saddam Hussein overthrown, and a democratically elected government in place under a new constitution), assert that the rest is up to the Iraqis, and leave. The difference is that in Vietnam, the US departure led to an end to the fighting, and a national re-union under one central government. In Iraq, the parallel may more correctly be Lebanon, multiplied many times over.

That is because the divisions within Iraq are coming to the fore. Instead of people coming together, the conflicts are growing. The Shia-Sunni clashes have reached the stage where rapprochement seems all but impossible. The Kurds in the north will be making their own calculations about whether they can pitch for total independence. And yet, a division of the country is not a practical proposition without the shedding of enormous blood. Neighbouring countries (specifically Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and perhaps Syria) will be watching events closely and any one or more of them could intervene if it sees opportunity or necessity.

The regional dynamics will change. The US has angered mainstream opinion in the Muslim world, and no one knows how this will manifest itself. One eruption has already taken place, in the election of Hamas in Palestine. At the other end of the arc, Pakistan is playing games again""if the Afghan authorities are to be believed. In between, Iran's next moves might be the most important. Many post-mortems will be written on how and why the Bush strategy for the region failed so dramatically (not enough troops on the ground, no focus on how to administer the country after military victory, under-estimating the problems of transition to a peaceful democracy). The US itself could become more isolationist in its responses to international crises, and its ability to intervene in various issues (like Iran going nuclear) will be impaired. Certainly, the talk of a new imperial age will stop. That last is to be welcomed. But right now, the harsh truth is that in West Asia, it is beginning to look like a worst case scenario.