An explosive problem

The tragedy of exploding scrap at a steel plant in Ghaziabad, in which 10 people were killed and several injured, looks increasingly likely to repeat itself. It turns out that this was not an isolated occurrence of live ammunition being mixed in with a shipment of metal scrap.

After that incident, everybody has been very carefully inspecting their scrap shipments and it is now clear that several of them, imported by smelters as far apart as UP and Maharashtra, are similarly contaminated.

Scrap smelting is a highly fragmented industry and it should come as no surprise if other parts of the country also find live rockets and other explosive devices in their stocks of scrap. The hazards that these pose to human life and property raise questions relating to both immediate solutions and future policy. Also, questions arise when it becomes clear that some of the contaminated shipments were found quite far away from smelter locations.

The governance problem in this situation is quite clear. This scrap has been imported from West Asia and falls under the general category of "war scrap", which is expected to contain live ammunition and is therefore far cheaper than ordinary scrap.

Rules of origin do exist for such situations; if the scrap was known to originate from ports in or around war zones, a certification of the safety of the shipment is required. This episode demonstrates how easy it is to get around this requirement; customs scrutiny does not, in any case, cover every single shipment, let alone a fine-tooth comb approach to bulk cargoes like scrap.

Apart from turning away shipments that do not satisfy these requirements, there are also concerns about full disclosure and transparency. It was pointed out in this newspaper yesterday that the Kolkata Customs had issued a notice requiring 100 per cent inspection of metal scrap, after removal to a separate yard or warehouse.

This was done almost two months ago. It is not clear what motivated this notice, but if it was the fear of explosive devices, this concern should have been transmitted to all Customs offices as well as importers. A little vigilance, based on a full transmission of that notice and the reasons for issuing it, might have saved the lives of the Ghaziabad victims.

An immediate enforcement of the rules of origin is, therefore, absolutely necessary. This may raise scrap prices and hurt smaller processors, but that cannot be allowed to override public safety and national security.

Additional requirements, like insisting on fully shredded scrap, which will presumably deal with the presence of explosives at the point of shipping, will also have the same impact.

The bottom line is that if scrap imports bring with them a threat to safety, the cost of neutralising that threat must be borne by the people who use that scrap, either directly or indirectly.

This cost simply cannot be borne by the state, by way of more detailed scrutiny and safe disposal of any ammunition that is found. This will provide an incentive for importers to import "peace scrap" instead of "war scrap".